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ABSTRACT 
Whenever there is a merger between two publicly held companies in the form of a 
stock transaction, the companies must provide a proxy-prospectus to their shareholders 
with enough information to vote on the proposed merger.  The proxy-prospectus contains 
mandatory pro forma financial statements as if the firms had merged as of the end of the 
previous year.  Occasionally, the proxy-prospectus contains voluntary, forward-looking 
information, such as projected earnings per share (EPS) or price-to-earnings (PE) ratios 
of the combined firm.   
There are two reasons that management may provide this voluntary forward-
looking information:  1) management could be providing an optimistic view of the new 
firm to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger or 2) the information 
could be used to provide a clearer picture to help management reduce the information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders. 
This study investigates the factors that increase the likelihood of a merger being 
completed.  Second, this study examines the impact that important reporting incentives 
and firm characteristics have on whether or not firms choose to voluntarily disclose 
earnings estimates.  Lastly, this study examines earnings forecast bias and the factors 
related to the accuracy and bias of the voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates. 
 Results indicate that shareholders of bidder firms that are weaker financially are 
more likely to approve a merger suggesting that shareholders of weaker firms might be 
trying to get stronger by merging with another firm.  Second, bidder firms with stronger 
financial characteristics and target firms with weaker financial characteristics are more 
apt to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  Additionally, for those firms that provided 
EPS forecasts, the forecasts were positively biased.  These findings indicate that 
vi 
management of bidder firms that are stronger financially may use these voluntary EPS 
forecasts to enhance the future outlook of the firm. 
Lastly, firms that provided voluntary earnings estimates were examined.  Results 
indicate that firms with stronger corporate governance provided more accurate and less 
biased EPS forecasts.  This suggests that corporate governance, which is in place to 
protect shareholder rights, is doing its job. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of those firms that 
voluntarily disclose forward-looking earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus when 
completing a merger.  This study examines whether or not voluntarily disclosing earnings 
estimates increases the likelihood of a merger being completed.  For those firms that 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, this study also examines the bias and accuracy of 
the estimates as well as the financial and corporate governance characteristics of the 
firms that produce more accurate forecasts. 
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management for 
both firms have decided to go forward with the merger and have agreed on the post-
merger management compensation.  In the Titan Corp. - Lockheed Martin Corp. merger, 
the post-merger management compensation included severance payments of three times 
the sum of the base salary and highest bonus, fully vesting options and retirement plans, 
$100,000 in outplacement services, and $800,000 for an office and secretary during the 
next five years.  These amounts totaled $10 million for the top three executives.  In the 
Shell Oil - Quaker State merger, executives and directors received a cash payment of all 
vested and unvested options and two times the sum of their annual salary and target 
bonus.  This post-merger compensation provides an incentive for management to provide 
shareholders with enough information to increase the likelihood that the merger will be 
completed.  The voluntarily provided, forward-looking information could be interpreted 
in one of two ways:  1) the information could be used to provide an optimistic picture of 
the new firm to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger or 2) the 
information could be used to provide a clearer picture to help management reduce the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders. 
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When two companies merge, there are four important dates:  1) the announcement 
date, 2) the proxy-prospectus filing date, 3) the proxy vote date, and 4) the merger date.  
The announcement date is the date that management announces to the public that there is 
a proposed merger, the proxy-prospectus filing date is the date that the firms provide 
information to the shareholders, the proxy vote date is the date that shareholders of both 
the bidder and target firms vote on the proposed merger, and the merger date is the 
effective date of the merger.  When both companies are publicly traded and there is a 
stock transaction in connection with the merger, the firms must provide shareholders with 
a proxy-prospectus detailing the merger and allowing the stockholders to vote on the 
proposed merger.  The filing date of the proxy-prospectus comes after the announcement 
date and before the merger date.  Figure 1 provides a timeline of events associated with a 
typical merger or acquisition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Timeline of events associated with a typical merger or acquisition 
(using hypothetical dates) 
 
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged 
on 12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the 
completed firm as of 12/31/2002 
Announcement 
Date 
Merger 
Date 
Proxy-
Prospectus 
Filing 
Date* 
Earnings 
Announcement 
Target 
Combined Firm 
Bidder 
12/31/2001  3/31/2002   6/30/2002  9/30/2002 12/31/2002 5/31/2002 
Proxy 
Vote 
Date 
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 Included in the proxy-prospectus is mandatory information such as merger 
consideration, voting rights, and pro forma financial statements as if the two firms had 
merged at the end of the previous year.  Additionally, the proxy-prospectus may include 
some forward-looking information, such as forecasted earnings per share (EPS) or the 
forecasted price-to-earnings ratio (PE Ratio) of the combined firm.  These earnings 
estimates are voluntary and are not provided in all proxy prospectus filings.  Since these 
earnings estimates are voluntary, it provides a setting in which to investigate several 
aspects of firms’ reporting behavior.  First, this study investigates whether voluntarily 
disclosing these earnings estimates increases the probability of completing a merger.  
Second, this study examines the impact that important reporting incentives and firm 
characteristics (including financial and corporate governance characteristics) have on 
whether or not firms choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  Lastly, this study 
examines factors related to the accuracy and bias of the voluntarily disclosed earnings 
estimates. 
While Brennan [1999] examined voluntary disclosure prior to and during the 
announcement, the current study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by examining 
the firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure at the time of the proxy-prospectus.  The 
time of the proxy-prospectus is important because it is filed at a time when there may be 
tension between the incentives of management and the shareholders.  Also, incentive 
conflicts may exist between the boards of directors and management prior to the merger 
agreement.  Management of the target firm must agree on post-merger compensation 
since their firm will no longer be in existence while the management of the bidder firm 
will be held accountable for the quality of the merger.  At the time of the proxy-
prospectus, management of both firms know the consequences of the merger and have 
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agreed to move forward with the merger, therefore it is assumed that the conflicts 
between the boards of directors and management have been resolved once the post-
merger compensation has been negotiated.  This study focuses on the information 
voluntarily disclosed to the shareholders at the time of the proxy-prospectus. 
By examining the financial and corporate governance characteristics of both the 
bidder and target firms, this study identifies the characteristics of the firms that choose to 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  Stronger financial and corporate governance 
characteristics may suggest that management voluntarily discloses earnings estimates to 
reduce the asymmetric information between management and shareholders, while weaker 
financial and corporate governance characteristics suggest that management voluntarily 
discloses earnings estimates to persuade their shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.  
In other words, firms that are stronger financially or have stronger corporate governance 
may provide as much information as possible since there is no need to hide the 
information from the shareholders, while firms that are weaker financially or have 
weaker corporate governance may need to provide information to persuade shareholders 
to vote in favor of the merger. 
Additionally, the voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates are examined to 
determine if they are optimistically biased and to determine if the earnings estimates 
enhance the likelihood of a merger being completed.  Optimistically biased earnings 
estimates may be indicative of management using voluntary disclosure to persuade 
shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.  Lastly, the financial and corporate 
governance characteristics of the firms that voluntarily disclose earnings estimates are 
analyzed to examine the factors that may increase forecast accuracy.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; the next chapter describes the 
related literature.  Chapter 3.0 develops the hypotheses, chapter 4.0 presents details of the 
research methodology employed, chapter 5.0 reports empirical analysis and results, and 
chapter 6.0 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Mergers and acquisitions have been extensively researched in the finance 
literature.  Most of this literature focuses on stock price returns of the target and bidder 
firms before, during, and after the merger or acquisition.  Asquith et al. [1983]; Bradley 
[1980]; Bradley et al. [1983]; Dodd and Ruback [1977]; Eckbo [1983]; Jarrell and 
Bradley [1980]; Kummer and Hoffmeister [1978]; Malatesta [1983], and Ruback [1983] 
examined large window effects (1 month) around the announcement date and found that 
target firms have high returns (approximately 20%) while bidding firms have much lower 
returns (between 2% and 6%) around the announcement date.  Other studies have 
examined small window effects (1-5 days) of mergers and found that target firms 
received returns around 8% while bidder firms had insignificant returns (Asquith et al. 
[1983]; Dodd [1980]; and Eckbo [1983]). 
Jarrell et al. [1988] examined the source of the gains that are associated with 
mergers and acquisitions and found no evidence of systematic losses by the bidding firms 
that would offset the large gains that the target firms are receiving.  These findings 
suggest that mergers and acquisitions create value to the economy. 
Other merger and acquisition studies have examined the types of firms that 
choose to merge.  There is some evidence of industry clustering of mergers due to 
industry shocks that require firms to merge to be more productive (Andrade et al. [2001]; 
Gort [1969], Healy et al. [1992]; Jensen [1986]; and Jensen [1993]).  Healy et al. [1992] 
extend the previous studies by examining post-merger operating performance of firms 
compared to the industry median and found that merged firms performed better than their 
non-merged industry counterparts providing additional evidence that mergers and 
acquisitions are beneficial to the economy. 
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 Given that mergers and acquisitions appear to provide value to the economy and 
that target firms appear to benefit more from a merger, it is beneficial to determine how 
managers convince the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger since an agency 
conflict may exist between management and shareholders.  For example, at the time of 
the proxy-prospectus, management of the two firms have negotiated and completed their 
post-merger compensation and may have different incentives than the shareholders.  
Jensen and Meckling [1976] pointed out that agency problems exist with any company in 
which the owner is not also the operator.1  Corporate governance, including contracting, 
disclosure, and monitoring may help control agency problems by reducing the 
asymmetric information and incentive conflicts between management and shareholders.    
 Most voluntary disclosure literature deals with the frequency and time in which a 
company chooses to voluntarily disclose information.  Lang and Lundholm [2000] found 
that there was a significant increase in disclosures regarding performance and more 
management interpretation of the firm’s performance beginning six months prior to the 
offering.  There is also an increase in disclosure as the end of the year approaches, which 
reduces the external factors that may increase the forecast error (Waymire [1985] and 
McNichols [1989]).  
 Myers and Majluff [1984] indicated that companies making public equity or debt 
offerings have incentives to voluntarily disclose information to reduce information 
asymmetry.  Increased information asymmetry between management and shareholders 
increases the risk associated with the transaction, and therefore decreases the stock price 
of the firm.  Without the disclosure of earnings estimates, shareholders are left with 
                                                 
1 An agency problem may exist in a merger and acquisition setting once the boards of directors and 
management have agreed on their post-merger compensation.  At the time of the proxy prospectus, 
management may be acting in their best interest rather than the best interest of the shareholders of the firm. 
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insufficient information to make informed decisions as to whether or not the merger is 
economically beneficial.   
 Healy and Palepu [2001] discuss six forces that affect managers’ disclosure 
decisions.  These forces include capital market transactions, corporate control contests, 
stock compensation, litigations, proprietary costs, and management talent signaling.  
Capital market transactions will increase the quantity of disclosures in the merger and 
acquisition process, while corporate control may increase the accuracy of the disclosures. 
 Cox [1985]; Imhoff [1978]; Ruland [1979]; and Waymire [1985] examine the 
differences between those firms that issue earnings estimates and those firms that do not.  
They found that firms that issue earnings estimates are larger, have smoother, less 
volatile earnings, and have more accurate analyst forecasts.  Other characteristics that 
may increase the likelihood of firms issuing voluntary earnings forecasts include firms 
that had previously provided earnings forecasts (Frankel et al. [1995] and Ruland et al. 
[1990]) and firms within the same industry (Andrade et al. [2001]; Botosan and Harris 
[2000]; Gort [1969]; Jensen [1986]; and Jensen [1993]). 
 Additionally, Clarkson et al. [1992] examined some of the characteristics of those 
firms that disclosed earnings forecasts in Canadian IPO prospectuses and found that audit 
quality, underwriter prestige, and terms of offering are all reasons that a firm may issue 
earnings estimates.  These findings indicate that corporate governance factors may 
increase the likelihood of an earnings estimate.  Corporate governance factors that may 
decrease the frequency of management forecasts include the threat of competitor entry or 
a decrease in the percentage of the voting stock owned by management (Clarkson et al. 
[1992] and Ruland et al. [1990]).   
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 Another possible reason for management to voluntarily disclose information is to 
influence the cost of equity.  Botosan [1997] examined the cost of equity capital and 
voluntary disclosure and found that for smaller firms with less analyst following, there 
was a lower cost of equity capital for those firms that voluntarily disclosed background 
information, historical results, key non-financial statistics, projected information or 
management discussion and analysis in the annual report.   
 Additional literature addresses the issue of accuracy and bias of management 
forecasts.  Ajinkya and Gift [1984]; Pownall and Waymire [1989]; and Waymire [1984] 
examined the stock price effect and the information content of management forecasts.  
They found that management forecasts provided the market with management’s expected 
beliefs of the firm’s future earnings.  Each of these studies found that management 
forecasts provided information to the market and that the stock price moved in the 
direction of the news.  That is, good news resulted in positive stock price movements, and 
bad news resulted in negative stock price movements.  Ajinkya and Gift [1984] also 
indicated that management forecasts were slightly biased. 
 Waymire [1986] and Hassell and Jennings [1986] examined the accuracy of 
management’s forecasts as compared to analysts’ forecasts and found that management’s 
forecast are more accurate than prior analysts’ forecast.  Hassell et al. [1988] found that 
analysts revised their forecast once management provided the information, and Imhoff 
[1978] found that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate for companies that provided 
management forecasts.  Together these studies provide evidence that management’s 
forecasts are being used by analysts and provide information to the market.  Thus, 
managers have a reasonable basis for believing that providing earnings forecasts would 
be an effective mechanism for convincing shareholders to approve a merger. 
10 
 One mechanism for management to provide a better earnings forecast is to utilize 
earnings management.  Christie and Zimmerman [1994]; DeAngelo [1988]; Grossman 
and Hart [1980]; Groff and Wright [1989]; and Grossman and Hart [1981] found that 
target firm managers make more income increasing accounting choices than their non-
target counterparts.  Erickson and Wang [1999] found evidence that bidding firms 
overstate their earnings reports in the quarter preceding a stock swap announcement and 
indicate that the market expects this overstatement and discounts the stock price 
accordingly. 
 Brennan [1999] examined the voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts by target 
firms in the UK.  The bids were broken into three categories:  friendly bids, hostile bids, 
or competing bids.  Brennan [1999] then combined hostile and competing bids into one 
category and called this category contested bids.  His study determined that there were 
different motivations between the two types of bids.  In friendly bids, the bidder may 
require the disclosure from the target firm and the earnings estimates are generally used 
to justify managements’ recommendation to the shareholders, while in contested bids, 
management of the target firm discourages completion of the merger by disclosing 
information that would indicate the shares of the target firm are more valuable than the 
bid price or by indicating that existing management would be better at running the target 
firm than the bidder. 
 While Brennan [1999] examined information prior to the announcement, the 
current study extends the literature by examining the financial and corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure at the time of the proxy-prospectus.  The proxy-
prospectus is filed after the merger has been announced and after the boards of directors 
and management of the two firms have already agreed upon the merger.   
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The proxy-prospectus of the merging firms include mandatory information such 
as merger consideration, voting rights, and pro forma financial statements as if the two 
firms had merged at the end of the previous year.  Additionally, the proxy-prospectus 
may include some forward-looking information such as forecasted EPS or forecasted PE 
Ratio of the combined firm.  These financial estimates are voluntary and are not provided 
in all proxy-prospectus filings.  The current study examines the firms that provide this 
voluntary information to determine whether the information contributes to the success of 
completing a merger, what types of firms provide the voluntary information, is the 
voluntary information biased, and what types of firms provide more accurate information. 
3.1  Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success 
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management of 
the two firms have already agreed on the terms for the completion of the merger or 
acquisition and now have an incentive to provide the shareholders information needed for 
their approval of the announced merger.  The first step in this study is to investigate 
whether or not the voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood of a 
merger being completed.  Additionally, the financial characteristics of the bidder and 
target firms are investigated to determine their effect on merger success. 
Brennan [1999] broke bids into three categories:  friendly bids, hostile bids, and 
competing bids and combined hostile and competing bids into one category and found 
that mergers were less likely to be completed when they were hostile or competing bids 
than when they were friendly bids.  Additionally, Andrade et al. [2001] found that larger 
firms that are in the same industry are more likely to complete a merger.   
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Other factors that may increase the likelihood of the merger being completed are 
whether the bidder firm can influence the decisions of the target firm or if there is a high 
price premium paid to the target.  One way for the bidder firm to influence the decision of 
the target firm is for the bidder firm to be significantly larger than the target firm making 
it difficult for the target firm to vote against the merger.  One example of the bidder firm 
being larger than the target firm is the IBM - Rational Software merger where IBM had 
over 50 times the total assets of Rational Software. 
If management has an incentive to make sure that the merger is approved, then 
management may use the voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates as a mechanism to 
persuade stockholders to vote in favor of the merger.  Based on the above, the first 
hypothesis is stated in the alternative format: 
H1a: Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood that a 
merger will be completed. 
 Additionally, the financial characteristics of the bidder and target firms may affect 
whether or not a merger is completed.  Firms with stronger financial characteristics may 
increase shareholder confidence, which may increase the likelihood of a merger being 
completed.  Alternatively, shareholders of stronger firms may be less likely to approve a 
merger if they perceive the other firm as weaker.  Another explanation could be that 
shareholders of firms with weaker financial characteristics are looking for ways to 
strengthen the firm.  One possible way to strengthen the firm is by merging with another 
firm.  Merging with another firm increases market share and decreases costs by creating 
synergy between the two firms (Ghosh 2004).  Utilizing this rationalization, firms with 
weaker financial characteristics may be more likely to complete the merger.   
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 Based on the alternative reasoning provided above, the following non-directional 
set of hypotheses is provided:  
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and 
the likelihood of the merger being completed. 
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and 
the likelihood of the merger being completed. 
 Figure 2 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis one with the events 
associated with a typical merger or acquisition.  The next section discusses the 
characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose financial information.  
Figure 2:  Timeline relationship of hypothesis one with the events associated with a 
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates) 
  
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on 
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined 
firm as of 12/31/2002 
 
 
Announcement 
Date 
Merger 
Date 
Proxy-
Prospectus 
Filing 
Date*
Earnings 
Announcement 
Target 
Combined Firm 
Bidder 
   H1 
12/31/2001  3/31/2002   6/30/2002   9/30/2002 12/31/2002 5/31/2002 
Proxy 
Vote 
Date 
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3.2 Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings Estimates 
As previously discussed, management has an incentive to complete the merger, 
and firms have a choice of whether or not to voluntarily disclose forward-looking 
information to their shareholders in the proxy-prospectus.  The current study compares 
the financial and corporate governance characteristics of firms that choose to voluntarily 
disclose information to the characteristics of firms that choose not to voluntarily disclose 
information in the proxy-prospectus. 
There are several firm characteristics that may increase voluntary disclosure.  
Lang and Lundholm [2000] and Myers and Majluff [1984] reported an increase in 
disclosure during the time of an equity offering.  The increased disclosure provided hype 
which led to a lower cost of capital.  Additionally, Healy and Palepu [2001] included 
capital market transactions and corporate control contests as two reasons for managers to 
voluntarily disclose information.  The current study examines mergers and acquisitions 
(one example of a capital market transaction), to determine what firm characteristics may 
cause managers to disclose voluntary information. 
Cox [1985]; Imhoff [1978]; Ruland [1979]; and Waymire [1985] indicated that 
firms that issue forecasts are larger and have smoother, less volatile earnings than firms 
that did not issue forecasts.  Clarkson et al. [1992] found that audit quality, underwriter 
prestige, and terms of the offering were all reasons that firms may issue forecasts.  
Additionally, Andrade et al. [2001], Gort [1969], Jensen [1986], Jensen [1993], and 
Botosan and Harris [2000] found that firms in the same industry were more likely to 
provide earnings forecasts.  
Ruland et al. [1990] and Frankel et al. [1995]) found that firms that had 
previously provided earnings forecasts are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in the 
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future.  Of course, firms that have never issued an earnings forecast may issue an 
earnings forecast in the joint proxy-prospectus, and conversely, firms that have issued an 
earnings forecast in every year may not provide a forecast in the joint proxy-prospectus.  
Without examining the future success of the merger, determining if providing an earnings 
forecast is a positive or negative signal is very difficult.  In this study, the prior earnings 
forecasts are simply used as a control, since previous studies have found that firms that 
have issued earnings forecasts in the past are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in the 
future.  
The current study examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics 
of both the bidder and target firms that choose to voluntarily disclose the earnings 
estimates as opposed to those firms that choose not to disclose any earnings estimates to 
their shareholders in the proxy-prospectus during a typical merger or acquisition.  
Possibly, firms with stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics are 
willing to provide more disclosure to reduce the asymmetric information between 
management and shareholders or those firms with weaker characteristics may disclose 
more to persuade its shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.  The current study 
identifies “weak” characteristics to include either poor financial performance or weak 
corporate governance.  Poor financial performance is also the primary predictor of 
litigation, which Healy and Palepu [2001] identify as an important determinant of 
managers’ disclosure decisions.   
Dating back to Ball and Brown [1968] and Beaver [1968], scholars have found 
that accounting has provided valued information to the market.  Diamond and Verrecchia 
[1991] and Kim and Verrecchia [1994] argue that voluntary disclosure accomplishes this 
same feat.  By providing additional information to the shareholders, the decreased 
16 
information asymmetry provides investors with more confidence in the value of the firm.  
If additional information increases shareholder confidence in the value of the firm, 
stronger firms may voluntarily disclose information to their shareholders to decrease the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders. 
Another reason management may voluntarily disclose forward-looking 
information in a merger and acquisition setting is to “sell” the merger to the shareholders.  
If management is using information to “sell” the merger, weaker firms may provide 
optimistic forecasts to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.  While there 
is a cost to providing optimistic forecasts, Erickson and Wang [1999] find evidence that 
acquiring firms overstate earnings in the quarter prior to a stock swap, and that the market 
anticipates the overstated earnings and discounts the firm’s stock price to compensate for 
the inflated earnings. 
Jensen and Meckling [1976] pointed out that agency problems exist when the 
incentives of the owners and management are not aligned.  One example of an agency 
problem that may exist in a merger and acquisition setting is a golden parachute for the 
CEO of the target firm.  Management is concerned about their post-merger income and 
job prospects while shareholders are interested in the value of their shares.  While one 
can argue that contracting could cause golden parachutes to be value increasing, in the 
case of a merger or acquisition, a golden parachute provides management with an 
incentive to provide information that may persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the 
merger. 
If management is trying to “sell” the merger to its shareholders, then firms with 
weaker financial performance as measured by Altman’s Z-Score and weaker corporate 
governance characteristics as measured by the G-Index will be more likely to voluntarily 
17 
disclose earnings estimates.  If firms with stronger financial and corporate governance 
characteristics voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, the finding suggests that stronger 
firms provide more information to reduce information asymmetry between management 
and shareholders.  Given the alternative reasoning provided above, the following set of 
non-directional hypotheses is provided: 
H2a:  There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and 
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings 
estimates.  
H2b:  There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and 
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings 
estimates.  
H2c:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of 
the bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily 
disclose earnings estimates.  
H2d:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of 
the target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily 
disclose earnings estimates.  
H2e:  There is an association between target firms that have CEO golden 
parachutes and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily 
disclose earnings estimates. 
 Figure 3 reflects the timeline relationship of hypotheses two with the events 
associated with at typical merger or acquisition.  The next section discusses earnings 
estimate bias. 
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Figure 3:  Timeline relationship of hypothesis two with the events associated with a 
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates) 
 
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on 
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined 
firm as of 12/31/2002 
 
3.3 Earnings Estimate Bias 
 At the time of the proxy-prospectus, management of both the bidder and target 
firms have already agreed upon the terms of the merger.  Management now has an 
incentive to provide information that will help persuade shareholders to vote in favor of 
the merger.  In the proxy-prospectus, firms typically voluntarily disclose forward-looking 
earnings information in one of two ways: an EPS forecast or a projected PE Ratio of the 
new firm. The EPS provides earnings per share of the company for the previous 
accounting period and the PE Ratio is used to measure investors’ expectation of higher 
earnings growth.  Since EPS and PE Ratio are two very different measures of financial 
strength, the mergers are separated into two samples and examined separately.   
Announcement 
Date 
Merger 
Date 
Proxy-
Prospectus 
Filing 
Date*
Earnings 
Announcement 
Target 
Combined Firm 
Bidder 
   H2 
12/31/2001  3/31/2002   6/30/2002   9/30/2002 12/31/2002 5/31/2002 
Proxy 
Vote 
Date 
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Firms may provide optimistic forecasts to paint a more favorable picture of the 
completed merger or firms may provide more information to reduce information 
asymmetry. An optimistically biased earnings estimate provides evidence that 
management uses voluntary disclosure to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the 
merger while an unbiased earnings estimate provides evidence that management provides 
information to reduce information asymmetry. 
 While EPS and PE Ratios are very different estimates, both are used by investors 
to determine the strength of the firm.  Since it is considered better for these two measures 
to be high, similar results are anticipated for both samples. Based on the above, the 
following set of hypotheses is tested: 
H3a: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm is positively 
biased. 
H3b: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new firm is 
positively biased. 
 This study now examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics 
of the firms that voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts.  While prior literature focuses on 
characteristics that increase forecast accuracy, the expectation that some of these same 
characteristics will decrease forecast bias.  The size of the firm, whether or not the firm 
has issued previous earnings forecasts, auditor quality, and underwriter prestige are 
characteristics that increase the accuracy of the forecasts (Clarkson et al. [1992] and 
Clarkson [2000]).  Additionally, forecasts that are issued closer to the end of the year 
provide more accurate forecasts (Waymire [1985] and McNichols [1989]). 
 Firms that are stronger financially and have stronger corporate governance 
characteristics should have less incentive to provide forecasts that are biased.  Based on 
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the above discussion, the following set of hypotheses is tested: 
H3c: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging 
firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
H3d: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging 
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
H3e: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
H3f: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
 Figure 4 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis three with the events 
associated with a typical merger or acquisition.  The next section discusses the 
characteristics of firms with greater forecast accuracy. 
Figure 4:  Timeline relationship of hypothesis three with the events associated with a 
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates) 
 
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on 
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined 
firm as of 12/31/2002 
Announcement 
Date 
Merger 
Date 
Proxy-
Prospectus 
Filing 
Date*
Earnings 
Announcement 
Target 
Combined Firm 
Bidder 
12/31/2001  3/31/2002   6/30/2002   9/30/2002 12/31/2002 5/31/2002 
Proxy 
Vote 
Date 
H3 
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3.4 Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy 
Once the firms that have voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates to their 
shareholders have been identified, the characteristics that are associated with greater 
forecast accuracy will be examined.  Some of the same characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of providing forecasts will also increase the accuracy of the forecasts.  For 
instance, the size of the firm, whether or not the firm has issued previous earnings 
forecasts, auditor quality, and underwriter prestige are all characteristics that may 
increase the accuracy of the forecasts (Clarkson et al. [1992] and Clarkson [2000]).  
Auditors are involved in the entire merger and acquisition process and provide a 
monitoring service that should increase the validity of all information provided in the 
proxy-prospectus.  Additionally, Waymire [1985] and McNichols [1989] indicated that 
management forecasts are more accurate as they are issued closer to year end creating the 
need to control for the amount of time between the forecast date and the actual earnings 
date. 
Stronger firms should provide better information to their shareholders.  If this 
rationale is true, firms with stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics 
will provide more accurate forecasts.  Based upon the above, the following set of 
hypotheses is tested (stated in the alternative form): 
H4a: EPS forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging firms 
that have stronger financial characteristics. 
H4b: EPS forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging firms 
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
H4c: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging 
firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
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H4d: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging 
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
 Figure 5 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis four with the events 
associated with a typical merger or acquisition.  The next section provides an overview of 
the hypotheses and how they relate to one another. 
Figure 5:  Timeline relationship of hypothesis four with the events associated with a 
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates) 
 
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on 
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined 
firm as of 12/31/2002 
 
3.5 Overview of Hypotheses 
 At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management for 
both firms have decided to go forward with the merger and have agreed on the post-
merger management compensation.  In some instances, management provides voluntary 
earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus.  Two reasons that management may provide 
Announcement 
Date 
Merger 
Date 
Proxy-
Prospectus 
Filing 
Date*
Earnings 
Announcement 
Target 
Combined Firm 
Bidder 
  H4 
12/31/2001  3/31/2002   6/30/2002   9/30/2002 12/31/2002 5/31/2002 
Proxy 
Vote 
Date 
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this voluntary information are 1) to provide an optimistic view of the new firm or 2) to 
provide information to reduce the information asymmetry between management and 
stockholders. 
 The first set of hypotheses examines firms that have decided to voluntarily 
disclose or not disclose earnings estimates.  Since management has an incentive to 
complete the merger, disclosing earnings estimates should be used to increase the 
likelihood of the merger being completed.  Additionally, financial characteristics of the 
bidder and target firms are examined to determine if firms that have stronger or weaker 
financial characteristics are more likely to complete the merger. 
 The second set of hypotheses moves one step further by examining the 
characteristics of those firms that choose to voluntarily disclose as opposed to those firms 
that choose not to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  Do firms with weaker 
financial and corporate governance characteristics need to voluntarily disclose 
information to show that the merger benefits the shareholders or are firms with stronger 
financial and corporate governance characteristics just providing as much information as 
possible to reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders? 
 The third set of hypotheses determines if the earnings forecasts are biased.  If 
firms with weaker financial and corporate governance characteristics are trying to 
persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, they may need to provide an 
earnings forecast that paints a bright future for the combined firm.  One way to paint a 
more favorable picture is to provide an optimistically biased earnings forecast.  
Additionally, the financial and corporate governance characteristics of the bidder and 
target firm are examined to determine what factors may decrease forecast bias. 
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 The fourth set of hypotheses examines those financial and corporate governance 
characteristics of the firms that voluntarily provide earnings forecasts to determine what 
types of firms provide more accurate earnings forecasts.   
 Table 1 provides a summary of the research hypotheses and chapter 4 describes 
the sample and defines the variables used to test the above hypotheses.  The next section 
of the paper explains the research methodology employed. 
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Table 1 - Summary of Hypotheses 
 
H1a:  Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood that a merger 
will be completed. 
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and the 
likelihood of the merger being completed. 
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and the 
likelihood of the merger being completed. 
 
H2a:  There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and the 
decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. 
H2b:  There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and the 
decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. 
H2c:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of the 
bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose 
earnings estimates.  
H2d:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of the 
target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose 
earnings estimates.  
H2e:  There is an association between target firms that have CEO golden parachutes and 
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings 
estimates. 
 
H3a:  For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm is positively 
biased. 
H3b:  For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new firm is positively 
biased. 
H3c:  Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms that 
have stronger financial characteristics. 
H3d:  Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms 
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
H3e:  Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging 
firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
H3f:  Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms 
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
 
H4a:  EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that have 
stronger financial characteristics. 
H4b:  EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that have 
stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
H4c:  PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that 
have stronger financial characteristics.. 
H4d:  PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that 
have stronger corporate governance. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 This section of the paper describes the sample selection procedures used to arrive 
at the final samples for the hypotheses, the variable definitions, and the research design 
employed to test each set of hypotheses. 
4.1 Sample and Variable Definitions 
4.1.1 Sample Selection 
 The sample chosen for this study was collected from Thompson Financial’s, 
Securities Data Corp. (SDC) database and includes mergers with a transaction value of 
$1,000,000 or more that were announced during the years 2002 and 2003.  Tudor and 
Mohtadi [1997] compared the SDC database with five print databases and found that 
every transaction of $1,000,000 or more that was listed in the five print databases was 
listed in the SDC database.2  This study chooses $1,000,000 as a minimum transaction 
value to provide a more manageable data set by eliminating the smaller firms that may 
not have data readily available and by reducing the number of mergers that may be 
considered immaterial. These restrictions provide a beginning sample of 3,077 total 
mergers as opposed to 16,295 total mergers without these restrictions.  The years 2002 
and 2003 were used so that the study could use the two most recent years that actual 
earnings could be collected for up to three years after the merger announcement.  Three 
years after the merger announcement is necessary since some of the earnings forecasts 
are provided three years in advance.  This sample reduction provides a beginning sample 
of 2,901 announced mergers that were completed and 176 mergers that were withdrawn.   
 
                                                 
 
2 The print databases used were Mergers and Acquisitions, the Corporate Growth Report, the Merger 
Yearbook, the Merger and Acquisition Sourcebook, and SDC’s Worldwide M&D Database 
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 Using the 3,077 (2,901 completed and 176 withdrawn) announced mergers in 
Thompson Financial’s SDC database for the years 2002 and 2003, SEC’s Edgar database 
was searched to find 139 completed mergers and 8 withdrawn mergers that had filed a 
joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4).  
 The proxy-prospectus includes mandatory information such as merger 
consideration; golden parachute payment details; and pro forma financial statements of 
the merged entity as if the merger had occurred in the year prior to merger 
announcement.  Additionally, 57 of the mergers provided other voluntary information 
including projected EPS estimates or a projected PE Ratio of the combined firm.   
4.1.2 Hypotheses One Sample 
 The first set of hypotheses examines factors that may increase the likelihood of a 
merger being completed.  Of the 147 (139 completed and 8 withdrawn) mergers in the 
sample, the premium paid for 22 mergers was not calculated due to either the bidder or 
target firms not being traded on a major stock exchange.  This sample reduction brings 
the sample for the first set of hypotheses to 125 mergers, including 117 completed 
mergers and 8 withdrawn mergers. 
Table 2 – Hypotheses One Sample Selection Procedures 
Reduced Sample 147 Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute the premium paid (22) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute Bidder Z-Score (BFIN) (17) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute Target Z-Score (TFIN) (16) Mergers 
Equals Hypotheses One Final Sample  92  Mergers 
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 Of the 125 mergers, the financial strength variables (BFIN and TFIN)3 could not 
be calculated for 39 mergers, thus reducing the final sample for the first set of hypotheses 
to 92 mergers.  Table 2 provides information on the sample selection for the first set of 
hypotheses.  The following section examines the sample selection procedures used to test 
the second set of hypotheses.  
4.1.3 Hypotheses Two Sample 
 The second set of hypotheses examines the characteristics of firms that choose to 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  The financial strength variables (BFIN and 
TFIN) could not be calculated for 39 mergers while the corporate governance variables 
BGINDEX and TGINDEX could not be calculated for an additional 72 mergers.  The 
final sample for the second set of hypotheses includes 28 mergers in which all variables 
could be calculated.  Table 3 provides information on the final sample for the second set 
of hypotheses.  The next section examines the sample selection procedures used to test 
the third and fourth sets of hypotheses. 
Table 3 – Hypotheses Two Sample Selection Procedures 
Reduced Sample 147 Mergers 
Less:  Mergers withdrawn  (8) Withdrawn Mergers 
Equals Total Completed Mergers 139 Completed Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute Bidder Z-Score (BFIN) (19) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute Target Z-Score (TFIN) (20) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing for BGINDEX (16) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing for TGINDEX (56) Mergers 
Equals Hypotheses Two Final Sample   28  Mergers 
 
                                                 
3 The variable BFIN is measured as Altman’s Z-score for the bidder firm and the variable TFIN is 
measured as Altman’s Z-score of the target firm.  These variables are further explained in section 4.2.2.1. 
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4.1.4 Hypotheses Three and Four Samples 
 To examine the bias and accuracy of the earnings forecasts, the sample is limited 
to companies choosing to provide EPS estimates or PE Ratio estimates for the merged 
entity.  Of the sample of 139 completed mergers, there were a total of 69 forecasts from 
57 mergers.   Eleven mergers provided forecasts for more than one year, and one merger 
provided both a forecasted EPS and a forecasted PE Ratio.  For the eleven firms that 
provided forecasts for more than one year, the forecast closest to the announcement date 
is used.  For the one firm that provided an EPS and a PE Ratio forecast, both forecasts are 
examined bringing the total EPS forecasts to 30 and the total PE Ratio forecasts to 28.    
These 58 forecasts are used to determine if the EPS and PE Ratio forecasts are biased.  
Panel A of table 4 presents information on the final sample selection procedures for 
hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
 Once the tests establish whether or not the forecasts are biased, the study then 
focuses on the firm characteristics that may decrease earnings forecast bias.  The 30 
mergers that produced EPS forecasts are examined to determine the firm characteristics 
that may decrease EPS forecast bias.  This sample begins with 30 mergers, of which, the 
financial strength of the bidder could not be calculated for 4 mergers and the financial 
strength of the target firm could not be calculated for an additional 6 mergers.  Of the 
twenty mergers that are remaining, the G-index of the bidder firm was unavailable for 1 
firm.  The final sample used to test hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b includes 19 
mergers.  There were 11 additional mergers in which the G-index of the target firm was 
unavailable.  Including the variable TGINDEX would have reduced the sample to 8 
mergers for a model that includes 12 variables and therefore, the variable TGINDEX is 
omitted from this examination.  Panel B of table 4 presents information on the final 
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sample to tests hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b. 
 Of the 28 mergers that produced PE Ratio forecasts, there were 7 mergers in 
which BFIN could not be calculated and an additional 4 mergers in which TFIN could 
not be calculated.  The sample reduction produces a final sample of 17 mergers used to 
test hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d.  There were an additional 9 mergers in which 
the G-index of the target firm was unavailable, therefore, the variable TGINDEX is 
omitted from this examination.  Panel C of table 4 presents information on the final 
sample to test hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d. 
  The next section of the paper defines the variables used to test each set of 
hypotheses. 
Table 5 - Hypotheses Three and Four Samples Sample Selection Procedures 
Panel A – Forecast Bias Sample  
Reduced Sample:  Completed Mergers 139 Mergers 
Less:  Mergers that did not disclose earnings estimates (82) Mergers 
Equals Total number of mergers that disclosed earnings estimates  57  Mergers* 
  
Total number of mergers that provided EPS forecasts  30  Mergers 
Total number of mergers that provided PE Ratio forecasts  28  Mergers 
 
Panel B – Characteristics of firms that provide less biased or more accurate EPS 
Forecasts 
Total number of mergers that provided EPS Forecasts 30  Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute BFIN (4) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute TFIN (6) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing for BGINDEX (1) Merger 
Equals Hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b final sample 19  Mergers 
  
Panel C – Characteristics of firms that provide less biased or more accurate PE Ratio 
Forecasts 
Total number of mergers that provided EPS Forecasts 28  Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute BFIN (7) Mergers 
Less:  Data missing to compute TFIN (4) Mergers 
Equals Hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d final sample 17  Mergers 
  
* 1 merger provided both an EPS forecast and a PE Ratio forecast creating a total of 58 
forecasts from 57 mergers. 
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4.2 Variable Definitions 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
4.2.1.1 Merger Completion 
 To test the first set of hypotheses, the dependent variable (COMPLETE) is 
measured as the likelihood of a merger being completed.  This variable is gathered from 
Thompson Financial’s SDC Database and is a dichotomous variable where the variable is 
equal to 1 if the merger is completed and 0 if the merger is withdrawn. 
4.2.1.2 Disclosure 
 To test the second set of hypotheses, the dependent variable (DISC) is measured 
as the likelihood of a merger voluntarily disclosing an earnings estimate.  This variable is 
collected from the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) and is a dichotomous variable where 
the variable is equal to 1 if the forecasted EPS or the forecasted PE Ratio is voluntarily 
disclosed in the joint proxy-prospectus and 0 otherwise.  Additionally, this variable is a 
dependent variable used to test hypothesis H1a. 
4.2.1.3 Forecast Error 
 Forecast error is calculated using the forecasted EPS or PE Ratio collected from 
the joint proxy-prospectus and the actual EPS or PE Ratio gathered from Standard and 
Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual files.  The variable FE is then calculated as Forecast Error 
(FE) = (Forecasted – Actual) / |Actual|).  The forecast error is the dependent variable in 
the third set of hypotheses and the absolute value of the forecast error is the dependent 
variable in the fourth set of hypotheses. 
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4.2.2 Independent Variables 
4.2.2.1 Financial Strength Measurement 
 There have been several bankruptcy prediction models introduced into the 
literature.  Altman [1968], Ohlson [1980], and Zmijewski [1984] are a few of the more 
popular bankruptcy prediction models used in accounting research.  While these models 
are traditionally used to predict the probability of bankruptcy, this study uses the model 
to measure stronger or weaker financial characteristics.  Since this study is not using the 
model to predict bankruptcy and is simply using it as a measure of financial strength, 
there should be no preference as to which model is used.   
 To examine the financial characteristics of firms that provide voluntary earnings 
estimates, this study uses the Altman’s Z-Score (Altman [1968]) as a proxy for strong 
financial characteristics.   Altman’s Z-score is a bankruptcy prediction model that uses 
several measures of financial distress to calculate the probability of bankruptcy and is 
calculated using balance sheet and stock return data gathered from Standard and Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT annual files.  The Z-Score is a weighted average of several accounting 
ratios and is calculated using the formula: 
Z-Score = (3.3 * EBIT/Total Assets) + (0.99 * Net Sales/Total Assets) + (0.6 * Market 
Value of Equity/Total Liabilities) + (1.2 * Working Capital/Total Assets)  + (1.4 * 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
 Where, 
  EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
  Market Value of Equity = Stock Price * # Common Shares Outstanding 
  Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities         (1) 
A higher Z-Score indicates a firm is better off financially. 
 This study does not intend to declare these firms as good or bad, but uses 
Altman’s model as an indicator of financial strength to determine if a firm is stronger or 
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weaker financially.  The variable BFIN is Altman’s Z-score for the bidder firm while the 
variable TFIN is Altman’s Z-score of the target firm.  BFIN and TFIN are continuous 
variables and are the variables of interest in all four sets of hypotheses. 
4.2.2.2 Corporate Governance Measurement 
 The independent variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX are continuous variables 
collected from Thompson Financial’s, Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) 
corporate governance database for the bidder and target firms respectively.  These are 
variables of interest for the second, third, and fourth sets of hypotheses and proxy for the 
strength of corporate governance. 
 Gompers et al. [2003] calculate the G-Index using 22 firm level provisions and 6 
state provisions listed in the IRRC database.  Eight of these provisions overlap creating a 
maximum G-Index of 24.  Gompers et al. [2003] break the provisions into 5 groups:  
delay tactics, director protection, voting rights, other defenses, and state laws.  One point 
is added to the firm’s G-Index for each provision that restricts shareholder rights.  A 
lower G-Index indicates a democracy controlled firm, and therefore, stronger corporate 
governance. 
 The foundation for strong corporate governance is the ability of the board of 
directors to act independently of management.  Other measures of corporate governance 
include board of director size, percentage of outside directors, control of the board by the 
CEO or CFO, audit committee characteristics, and the existence of large block 
shareholders.  Each of these measures serves to protect shareholders’ rights by forcing the 
board of directors to act independently of management.  This study uses the G-Index to 
proxy for strong corporate governance since it was designed to proxy for shareholders’ 
rights.  
34 
4.2.2.3 Golden Parachute 
 To test hypotheses H2e, the independent variable (PCHUTE) is a dichotomous 
variable where the variable is equal to 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute 
in his contract.  This variable is gathered by searching the joint proxy-prospectus (form 
S-4) to determine whether or not the CEO has golden parachute. 
 The next section of the paper discusses the control variables included in the 
models. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
4.2.3.1 Size 
 This study uses the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for firm size.  The 
variable BSIZE proxies for bidder size while the variable TSIZE proxies for the size of 
the target.  The total assets of the firm are gathered for the year prior to the merger 
announcement from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual files.  These variables 
are control variables in all four sets of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.2 Influence 
  The variable INFLUENCE is calculated as the total assets of the bidder firm/the 
total assets of the target firm.  As discussed above, the total assets of both firms are 
gathered for the year prior to the merger from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual 
files.  This variable is a control variable in the first set of hypotheses and is a proxy for 
the amount of control the bidder firm has over the target firm. 
 An alternative measurement of influence is the ratio of BSIZE/TSIZE.  Each 
measurement will be examined to test sensitivity to the specification. 
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4.2.3.3 Premium 
 The variable PREMIUM is defined as Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement 
Date-1) – 1.  This measure is collected from Thompson Financial’s SDC database and is a 
control variable for the first set of hypotheses.  
4.2.3.4 Friendly 
 As in Brennan [1999], this variable is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the 
merger was deemed friendly and 0 otherwise.  Thompson Financial’s SDC database 
reports a deal as friendly if the target firm’s board of directors recommends the merger.  
The variable FRIENDLY is a control variable for the first set of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.5 Industry 
 As in Andrade et al. [2001], the variable INDUSTRY is defined as a dichotomous 
variable that equals 1 if both the bidder and target firms have the same 2-digit industry 
(SIC) code and 0 otherwise.  The SIC code is gathered from Thompson Financial’s SDC 
Database and is used as a control variable for the first two sets of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.6 Audit 
 The variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT are dichotomous variables that equal one if 
the bidder or target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor respectively.  The names of the auditors 
were collected from the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) from the SEC’s EDGAR 
Database.  These variables are control variables in all four sets of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.7 Underwriter Reputation 
 The underwriter reputation is measured using a reputation ranking based on 
Carter and Manaster [1990] and Carter et al. [1998].  Carter and Manaster [1990] and 
Carter et al. [1998] calculate the reputation ranking by examining initial public offering 
announcements and assigning an integer rank, 0 to 9, for each underwriter in the 
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announcement according to its position.  Using the names of the underwriters collected 
from the proxy-prospectus, a reputation ranking is assigned based on the rankings 
published in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO Underwriters:  1980-
2004.4  The variables BUWRITER and TUWRITER are control variables include in the 
second, third, and fourth sets of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.8 Previous Earnings Forecasts 
 The variable EF is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if either the bidder or 
target firm issued an earnings forecast in the year prior to the announcement.  A search of 
each firm on Lexis-Nexis was used to determine if the firm issued an earnings forecast in 
the previous year.  This is a control variable included in the second, third, and fourth sets 
of hypotheses. 
4.2.3.9 Horizon 
 As in Waymire [1985], the variable HORIZON is the percentage of the year 
remaining between the forecasted earnings estimate and the actual earnings.  The variable 
is continuous and is calculated as the number of days from the forecasted earnings to the 
actual earnings/365.  This is a control variable in which forecast accuracy and bias should 
be less as the variable HORIZON decreases.  This is a control variable included in the 
third and fourth sets of hypotheses. 
 Table 6 provides a summary of the variables and the next section describes the 
research design used to test each set of hypotheses. 
                                                 
4 Corwin and Schultz [2005] used the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO Underwriters when 
examining underwriter prestige. 
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Table 6 – List of Variables 
 
Variable Description Database Hypotheses Used In 
Expected 
Sign 
COMPLETE 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the merger is completed, 
0 otherwise 
SDC 
H1 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
DISC 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the firms provide 
forward-looking information 
(earnings or PE Ratios) of the 
combined firm, 0 otherwise 
Form S-4 
H1 
Independent 
Variable 
H2 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
+ 
FEEPS 
Earnings Per Share Forecast 
Error.   Calculated as:                
|FE = (Forecasted EPS – 
Actual EPS)/(Actual EPS)| 
Form S-4 
COMPUSTAT 
H3 & H4 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
FEPE 
PE Ratio Forecast Error – 
Calculated as:    
|FEpe = (Forecasted PE Ratio 
– Actual PE Ratio)/(Actual 
PE Ratio)| 
 
Form S-4 
COMPUSTAT 
H3 & H4 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
BFIN 
Bidder firm’s Z-score as 
calculated using Altman’s 
[1968] formula 
COMPUSTAT 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
TFIN 
Target firm’s Z-score as 
calculated using Altman’s 
[1968] formula 
COMPUSTAT 
H1 
H2  
H3 
H4 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] IRRC 
H2 
H3 
H4 
? 
- 
- 
TGINDEX G-Index of target firm from Gompers et al. [2003] IRRC 
H2 
H3 
H4 
? 
- 
- 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Variable Description Database Hypotheses Used In 
Expected 
Sign 
PCHUTE 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the target firm’s CEO has 
a golden parachute in their 
contract, 0 otherwise 
Form S-4 H2 ? 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets COMPUSTAT All + 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets COMPUSTAT All + 
INFLUENCE Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets COMPUSTAT H1 + 
PREMIUM (Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1 
SDC H1 + 
FRIENDLY 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the merger is friendly, 0 
otherwise 
SDC H1 + 
INDUSTRY 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the bidder and target 
firms have the same SIC 
Code, 0 otherwise 
SDC H1 + 
BAUDIT 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 
4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
Form S-4 
H2 
H3 
H4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
TAUDIT 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if the target firm uses a Big 
4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
Form S-4 
H2 
H3 
H4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
BUWRITER 
Rank of the Bidder Firm’s 
Underwriter as reported in the 
Carter-Manaster Reputation 
Rankings of Underwriters 
Form S-4 
H2 
H3 
H4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
TUWRITER 
Rank of the Target Firm’s 
Underwriter as reported in the 
Carter-Manaster Reputation 
Rankings of Underwriters 
Form S-4 
H2 
H3 
H4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Variable Description Database Hypotheses Used In 
Expected 
Sign 
EF 
Dichotomous variable equals 
1 if either the bidder or target 
firm issued earnings forecast 
in the previous period, 0 
otherwise 
Lexis-Nexis 
H2 
H3 
H4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
HORIZON 
# of days between earnings 
forecast and actual earnings / 
365 
Form S-4 
H3 
H4 
- 
- 
 
4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success 
 To test the prediction that voluntary disclosure is associated with the likelihood of 
a merger being completed and to examine the characteristics of the firms that are more 
likely to approve the merger, the following logistic regression model is used to test the 
first set of hypotheses: 
Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE  
+ β6 INDUSTRY + + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε       (2)  
where,  
COMPLETE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
FRIENDLY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise 
INFLUENCE Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets 
PREMIUM (Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1 
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 The variables of interest are DISC, BFIN, and TFIN.  A positive relationship 
between the disclosure variable (DISC) and completion of the merger indicates that the 
voluntary earnings estimates may be used to increase the likelihood of the merger being 
completed.  The variables BFIN and TFIN are proxies for the financial strength of the 
bidder and target firms.  A positive relationship between the financial strength of the 
firms and the completion of the merger indicates that firms that have stronger financial 
characteristics are more likely to complete the merger while a negative relationship 
indicates that firms that have weaker financial characteristics are more likely to complete 
the merger. 
 Andrade et al. [2001] found that larger firms that are in the same industry are 
more likely to complete a merger, while Brennan [1999] found that friendly mergers were 
more likely to be completed.  These studies created the necessity to control for firm size, 
industry, and bid type.  This study uses the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets to 
control for size, whether or not the bidder and target firm’s 2-digit SIC code is the same 
to control for industry, and whether or not the merger is friendly to control for bid type.  
 Additionally, other factors that may increase the likelihood of a merger being 
completed are the amount of control a bidder firm has over a target firm and the price 
premium paid by the bidder firm to purchase the target firm.  This study controls for 
these additional factors using the variables INFLUENCE and PREMIUM.  The next 
section examines the research design used to test the second set of hypotheses. 
4.3.2 Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings Estimates 
 To examine the characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose earnings 
estimates, the cross-sectional variations in the probability of disclosing or not disclosing 
on various firm characteristics are tested.  To test whether firms with stronger or weaker 
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financial or corporate governance characteristics voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, 
the following logistic regression is estimated to test the second set of hypotheses: 
Prob (DISC = 1) =  β0  
Test Variables:  + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINEX + β4 TGINDEX 
    + β5 PCHUTE  
Control Variables:  + β6 BSIZE + β7 TSIZE + β8 BAUDIT + β9 TAUDIT  
    + β10 BUWRITER + β11 TUWRITER + β12 EF  
    + β13 INDUSTRY    (3) 
Where: 
Variable 
 
Description 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
TGINDEX G-Index of target firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
PCHUTE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
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 The variables of interest are the financial strength variables BFIN and TFIN, the 
corporate governance variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX, and whether or not the target 
firm had a golden parachute in their contract (PCHUTE).   
A positive relationship between the financial strength variables and whether or 
not management chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates provides support for 
the idea that management is providing as much information as possible to the 
shareholders to reduce the information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders.  A negative relationship between the financial strength variables and 
voluntarily disclosing earnings estimates suggests that firms that are financially weaker 
are using this voluntary disclosure to help “sell” the merger to the shareholders. 
 A higher G-Index implies that a firm is structured more similar to that of a 
dictatorship and therefore has weaker corporate governance.  Therefore, a positive 
relationship between the corporate governance variables and whether or not management 
chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates supports the idea that management is 
using the voluntary disclosure to help “sell” the merger to the shareholders while a 
negative relationship between the corporate governance variables and whether or not 
management chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates suggests that stronger 
firms provide more information to help decrease information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders. 
 A golden parachute provides management with an incentive to provide 
information that may persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.  If this 
rationale is correct, the variable PCHUTE will be positively related to whether or not 
management voluntarily discloses earnings estimates. 
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 Cox [1985], Imhoff [1978] Ruland [1979], and Waymire [1985] found that larger 
firms are more likely to provide earnings forecasts.  This study controls for this using the 
variables BSIZE and TSIZE which are defined as the natural logarithm of the bidder and 
target firms’ total assets respectively.   
 Clarkson et al. [1992] found that firms with higher audit quality and higher 
underwriter prestige were more likely to issue earnings forecasts.  Audit quality is 
controlled for using a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the firm uses a Big 4 or Big 5 
auditor while underwriter prestige uses the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO 
Underwriters to control for underwriter reputation.   
 Ruland et al. [1990] and Frankel et al. [1995] found that firms that had previously 
provided earnings forecasts were more likely to issue earnings forecasts.  The variable EF 
controls for this by assigning a dichotomous variable of 1 if either the bidder or target 
firm provided an earnings forecast in the previous year.   
 Lastly, Andrade et al. [2001], Gort [1969], Jensen [1986], Jensen [1993], and 
Botosan and Harris [2000] provided evidence that firms in the same industry were more 
likely to issue earnings forecasts.  Mergers between firms in the same industry are 
controlled for using the variable INDUSTRY which is a dichotomous variable equaling 1 
if the bidder and target firms share the same 2-digit SIC code.  The following section 
examines the research design used to test the third set of hypotheses. 
4.3.3 Earnings Estimate Bias 
 As discussed in the development of Hypothesis 3, if management is trying to 
persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, then these forecasts may be 
optimistically biased to sway shareholder votes. 
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 Since this study examines both EPS and PE Ratio estimates of the merged entity, 
the firms are separated into two separate samples.  While these are two very different 
estimates, both EPS and PE Ratios are used by investors to determine the strength of the 
firm.  EPS provides the earnings per share of the company for the previous period and the 
PE Ratio is used measure investors’ expectation of higher earnings growth.  Since 
investors consider higher EPS and PE Ratios to be better, both samples should provide 
similar results. 
Using these projections, the accuracy of the forecast of the new firm is examined 
at the first earnings announcement of the year following the projection.  The forecast 
error for the earnings forecast will be calculated using the following:   
 
Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted EPS– Actual EPS) / |Actual EPS|)         (4) 
 
 
and the forecast error of the forecasted price-to-earnings ratio will be calculated using:   
 
 
Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) / |Actual PE Ratio|)   (5) 
 
 A t-test is used to determine if the forecast error for each sample is greater than 0.  
I the forecast error is greater than 0, the forecasted earnings are optimistically biased and 
management may be voluntarily disclosing information to persuade shareholders to vote 
in favor of the merger.    
 Once bias has been examined, the study now focuses on what firm characteristics 
are present when less biased forecasts are presented.  The following ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression is employed to test hypotheses H3c, H3d, H3e, and H3f: 
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FE =     β0 
Test Variables:  + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX  
Control Variables:  + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT  
    + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF  
    + β11 HORIZON           (6) 
Where: 
Variable Description 
FE Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|) 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
 
 Some of the same firm characteristics that lead to higher forecast accuracy will 
also lead to a smaller forecast bias.  The variables of interest are TFIN, BFIN, and 
BGINDEX.  BFIN and TFIN is the Altman Z-score (Altman [1968]) for the bidder and 
target firms respectively and BGINDEX is the G-Index gathered from Thompson 
Financial’s IRRC which calculates the G-Index as in Gompers et al. [2003] for the bidder 
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firm.  Firms that have stronger financial characteristics would have higher Altman Z-
scores, while firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics would have 
lower G-Index’s.   
  Stronger firms should not have as much of an incentive to provide biased 
forecasts as weaker firms.  Therefore, stronger firms would provide the forecasts that are 
less biased.  If firms that have stronger financial characteristics provide less biased 
forecasts, the variables BFIN and TFIN will be negatively associated with forecast error.  
If firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics provide less biased 
forecasts, the variables BGINDEX will be negatively associated with forecast error. 
 Clarkson et al. [1992] and Clarkson [2000] found that the size of the firm, 
whether or not the firm has issued previous earnings forecasts, auditor quality, and 
underwriter prestige are all characteristics that may increase the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts.  This study controls for size using the natural logarithm of total assets, auditor 
quality with a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the firm uses a big 4 or big 5 auditor, 
and underwriter prestige by using the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO 
Underwriters to control for underwriter reputation.  Whether or not a firm has issued 
previous earnings forecasts is controlled for by using a dichotomous variable equaling 1 
if either the bidder or target firm issued an earnings forecast in the previous year. 
 Another characteristic that may increase forecast accuracy is the amount of time 
between the forecast date and actual earnings date (Waymire [1985] and McNichols 
[1989]).  The amount of time between forecasted and actual dates is controlled for using 
the variable HORIZON, which is the number of days until year end divided by 365. 
 The following section examines the final data and research methodology for the 
fourth set of hypotheses. 
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4.3.4 Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy 
 To examine the characteristics of firms that provide more accurate forecasts, the 
absolute values of the forecast errors are calculated as in the previous section when 
measuring forecast bias.  The absolute values of the forecasts are used since this set of 
hypotheses are measuring forecast accuracy rather than forecast bias.  The absolute 
values of the forecast errors for both EPS and PE Ratio are: 
|Forecast Error (FEEPS)| = |(Forecasted EPS– Actual EPS) /|Actual EPS|)|   (7)  
and  
|Forecast Error (FEPE)| = |(Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) /|Actual PE Ratio|)| (8) 
 To examine the characteristics of firms that provide more accurate forecasts, the 
following ordinary least square (OLS) regression is employed to test the fourth set of 
hypotheses: 
|FE| =     β0 
Test Variables:  + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX  
Control Variables:  + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT  
    + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF  
    + β11 HORIZON           (9) 
Where: 
Variable Description 
|FE| Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.  
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)| 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
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BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
 
 The variables of interest are BFIN, TFIN, and BGINDEX.  The BFIN and TFIN 
variables measure the financial strength of the bidder and target firms while the variable 
BGINDEX measures the strength of the corporate governance of the bidder firm.   
 Logic indicates that stronger firms would provide the most accurate forecasts.  If 
firms that have stronger financial characteristics provide more accurate forecasts, the 
variable FIN will be negatively associated with the absolute value of the forecast error.  If 
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics provide more accurate 
forecasts, the variable GINDEX will be positively associated with the absolute value of 
the forecast error. 
 As in the tests of the third set of hypotheses, the test of the fourth set of 
hypotheses controls for firm size, auditor quality, underwriter prestige, whether or not a 
firm has issued previous earnings forecasts, and the amount of time between the forecast 
date and the end of the year.  
 Chapter 5 provides the descriptive statistics and empirical results for each set of 
hypotheses. 
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5. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the final samples used in 
testing the different sets of hypotheses.  Only the mean and median of the variables used 
in each of the hypotheses are reported and a discussion of each set of hypotheses follows.  
The next section examines the final samples used to test the first set of hypotheses. 
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics 
 H1 
N=92 
H2 
N=28 
H3 and H4 
EPS Sample 
N=19 
H3 and H4 PE 
Ratio Sample 
N=17 
Variable* Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
COMPLETE 0.95 1.00   
DISC 0.36 0.00 0.53 1.00   
BSIZE 14.81 14.83 15.82 15.95 15.85 15.69 15.34 14.87
TSIZE 13.22 13.24 14.34 14.21 14.05 14.02 13.57 13.27
INFLUENCE 22.21 3.80   
PREMIUM 22.31 20.47   
FRIENDLY 0.97 1.00   
INDUSTRY 0.73 1.00 0.50 1.00   
BAUDIT  0.93 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.89 1.00
TAUDIT  0.93 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.82 1.00
BUWRITER  8.41 9.10 7.64 9.00 6.74 9.00
TUWRITER  8.40 9.10 7.81 9.00 8.19 8.10
EF  0.54 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.50 0.50
HORIZON  1.20 1.13 0.94 0.87
BFIN 4.34 1.78 6.06 2.91 4.16 0.44 3.41 0.47
TFIN 3.61 1.41 3.04 1.71 1.97 0.30 3.21 2.00
BGINDEX  9.14 8.50  10.13 10.00
TGINDEX  8.46 8.00   
PCHUTE  0.36 0.00   
FE  1.11 0.33 0.38 0.07
|FE|  1.21 0.48 0.73 0.34
* All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 2 
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5.1.1 Hypotheses One  
The sample used to test the first set of hypotheses includes all mergers that filed a 
proxy-prospectus with the SEC and had enough information to calculate the size and 
financial strength of both the bidder and target firms.  These criteria yielded a final 
sample size of 92 mergers for H1.  Ninety of the mergers were considered friendly and 68 
of the mergers were between firms in the same industry.  The descriptive statistics in 
table 7 show that the size of the bidder firm is larger than the size of the target firm and 
the bidder firm is better off financially.  Additionally, the median value for the financial 
strength of the bidder firm (BFIN) is 1.78.  According to Altman [1968], a score below 
1.80 has a high risk of bankruptcy.  This observation may indicate that firms merge to 
strengthen their financial outlook. 
An examination of the correlations between the independent variables in the 
model finds that the correlation between the variables TSIZE and BSIZE is 0.6442 and is 
the only correlation above 0.40.  The model is tested for multicollinearity using variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each variable.  Netter et al. [1990] suggests that a VIF score 
above 10 indicates multicollinearity is a problem.  The variable TSIZE has a VIF of 3.00 
which is the highest VIF in this model and one can conclude that there is a low risk of 
multicollinearity.  Table 8 presents the correlations between the variables used to test the 
first set of hypotheses. 
Additionally, Pearson residuals were calculated to test for outliers.  Menard 
[2002] indicated that Pearson residuals that are less than -2 or greater than +2 may 
identify an observation that would be considered an outlier.  All of the Pearson residuals 
in the model are between -1 and +1 indicating that there are no outliers. 
The next section examines the data used to test the second set of hypotheses. 
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Table 8 - Correlation Matrix of Variables Used to Test H1 
 
Variables1 COMPLETE DISC TFIN BFIN TSIZE BSIZE INFLUENCE PREMIUM FRIENDLY INDUSTRY 
COMPLETE  1.000          
DISC  0.090  1.000         
TFIN -0.174* -0.012  1.000        
BFIN -0.361***  0.154  0.426**  1.000       
TSIZE  0.050  0.213 -0.350*** -0.245  1.000      
BSIZE  0.139  0.217** -0.209** -0.331***  0.644** 1.000     
INFLUENCE  0.067  0.131  0.062 -0.061 -0.301*** 0.252** 1.000    
PREMIUM -0.024  0.067  0.058 -0.022 -0.090 0.073 0.231**  1.000   
FRIENDLY  0.263** -0.055 -0.158 -0.355*** -0.021 0.002 0.038 -0.003 1.000  
INDUSTRY  0.144  0.096 -0.029 -0.068  0.208** 0.127 0.017 -0.010 0.251** 1.000 
1 All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6 
*     p<=.10 
**   p<=.05 
*** p<=.01 
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5.1.2 Hypotheses Two  
The sample used to test the second set of hypotheses is designed to examine the 
characteristics of those firms that choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.   To 
run this test, financial and corporate governance variables for both the target and bidder 
firms must be calculated.  These sample criteria left a final sample of 28 observations to 
be examined. 
As in the previous sample, the bidder firm is larger than the target firm and has 
stronger financial characteristics.  The variable BSIZE has a mean of 15.82 while the 
variable TSIZE has a mean of 14.34.  The variable BFIN has a mean of 6.06 and the 
variable TFIN has a mean of 3.04.  Additionally, both the bidder and target firms in the 
H2 sample are larger than in the previous sample that tests the first set of hypotheses.  
The size differences between the two samples are 15.82 vs. 14.81 for the variable BSIZE 
and 13.22 vs. 14.34 for the variable TSIZE (table 7).   
There is also a difference between the bidder firm’s financial strength variable 
(BFIN) in the two samples.  The variable BFIN has a mean of 6.06 in the H2 sample vs. 
4.34 in the H1 sample.  While there is a difference of the bidder firm’s financial strength 
between samples, both Z-scores signify a firm with little financial distress. 
A correlation analysis found that the variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT were 
identical and therefore the variable TAUDIT has been dropped from the regression to 
correct for multicollinearity.    Additionally, the size variables BSIZE and TSIZE have a 
correlation of 0.7461.  VIFs for each variable were calculated and TSIZE has the largest 
VIF of 4.47 indicating a slight risk of multicollinearity.  An additional test is performed 
to increase the sample size and verify results. Table 9 presents the correlations between 
the variables used to test the second set of hypotheses. 
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Table 9 - Correlation Matrix of Variables Used to Test H2 
 
Varables1 DISC BFIN TFIN BGINDEX TGINDEX PCHUTE INDUSTRY BSIZE TSIZE 
DISC  1.000         
BFIN  0.267  1.000        
TFIN  0.180  0.804**  1.000       
BGINDEX -0.197 -0.234 -0.406***  1.000      
TGINDEX -0.200 -0.295 -0.254  0.251 1.000     
PCHUTE -0.053 -0.176 -0.057  0.191 0.193  1.000    
INDUSTRY -0.016 -0.307 -0.189 -0.085 0.260 -0.011  1.000   
BSIZE -0.114 -0.414** -0.328  0.117 0.546***  0.054  0.286  1.000  
TSIZE -0.067 -0.541*** -0.482***  0.301 0.629***  0.064  0.438**  0.746  1.000 
BAUDIT  0.020  0.063  0.136 -0.408 0.191 -0.083  0.061  0.192***  0.171 
TAUDIT  0.020  0.063  0.136 -0.408 0.191 -0.083  0.061  0.192  0.171 
BUWRITER -0.206  0.173  0.180  0.093 0.85 -0.311 -0.194 -0.201 -0.025 
TUWRITER  0.012  0.146  0.190  0.027 0.093 -0.170  0.301 -0.110  0.071 
EF -0.005 -0.046  0.140 -0.342* 0.101  0.096 -0.162  0.138 -0.065 
All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6 
*      p<=.10 
**    p<=.05 
*** p<=.01 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 BAUDIT TAUDIT BUWRITER TUWRITER EF     
BAUDIT  1.000         
TAUDIT  1.000  1.000        
BUWRITER -0.030 -0.030 1.000       
TUWRITER -0.098 -0.098 0.077  1.000      
EF  0.020 -0.020 0.259 -0.109 1.000     
1 All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6 
*      p<=.10 
**    p<=.05 
*** p<=.01 
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To test for outliers, Pearson residuals were calculated and all residuals are 
between -1 and +1 indicating that there are no outliers in the sample.    The next section 
examines the data used to test EPS forecast bias and accuracy. 
5.1.3 Hypotheses Three and Four EPS Sample  
The sample used to test these sets of hypotheses is designed to examine factors 
that may influence EPS forecast bias and accuracy.  To test these characteristics, all 
financial and corporate governance variables for the bidder and target firm must be 
calculated.  Due to the lack of data availability, the corporate governance variable for the 
target firm was not examined.  The final sample used to test EPS forecast bias and 
accuracy includes 19 mergers. 
The bidder and target firms are slightly larger than the sample that tests the first 
set of hypotheses.   Note that the mean forecast error and absolute forecast error are much 
larger than the median and there is a large difference between the mean and median of the 
bidder and target firms’ financial variables.  The variable BFIN has a mean of 4.16 which 
would indicate a financially stable firm while the median is just 0.44 which indicates a 
firm is financially distressed.  The variable TFIN has a mean of 1.97 and a median of 
0.30 (Table 6).   
VIFs for each variable were examined and the variables EF and TUWRITER each 
had VIFs above 4.  VIFs above 4 indicate that there may me some indication of 
multicollinearity introduced in the model.  The correlation between these two variables is 
0.68 indicating that they are highly correlated.  A large correlation is not uncommon with 
a sample size this small and additional tests are performed to verify results.  Table 9 
presents the correlations between the variables used to test bias and accuracy of the EPS 
sample. 
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Pearson residuals were used to test for outliers and all residuals fell between -1.7 
and +1.7.  While these are higher than the other samples, they are between the -2 and +2 
that Menard [2002] describes as outliers and therefore no observations were deleted.  An 
additional test is performed to the sensitivity of variable specification of the financial 
strength variables.  The next section examines the data used to examine PE Ratio forecast 
accuracy and bias. 
5.1.4  Hypotheses Three and Four PE Ratio Sample 
The sample used to test these sets of hypotheses is designed to examine factors 
that may influence the PE Ratio forecast bias and accuracy.  To test these characteristics, 
financial and corporate governance variables for the bidder and target firm must be 
calculated.  As in the EPS sample, the strength of the target firm corporate governance 
was not examined due to the lack of corporate governance data availability.  The final 
sample used to test PE Ratio forecast bias and accuracy is 17 mergers. 
Once again, there is a difference between the mean and median of the forecast 
error and absolute forecast error in addition to the mean and median of the financial 
strength variables BFIN and TFIN (table 6).  Pearson residuals fell between -0.2 and +0.2 
indicating that no outliers were present.   
VIFs for each variable were calculated and the variables BGINDEX and BFIN 
had VIFs OF 4.18 and 4.11 respectively.  High VIFs are to be expected from a sample 
size this small and additional tests are performed to verify results.  Table 11 presents the 
correlations between the variables used to test bias and accuracy in the PE Ratio sample.  
 The next section provides the empirical results of the first set of hypotheses. 
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Table 10 - Correlation Matrix of Variables used to Test H3 and H4 (EPS Sample) 
 
Variables1 FEEPS BFIN TFIN BGINDEX BSIZE TSIZE BAUIDT TAUDIT BUWRITER TUWRITER EF HORIZON 
FEEPS  1.000            
BFIN  0.345  1.000           
TFIN  0.227  0.197  1.000          
BGINDEX  0.098 -0.304 -0.657***  1.000         
BSIZE -0.091 -0.352 -0.232  0.214  1.000        
TSIZE  0.243 -0.398* -0.296  0.241  0.685***  1.000       
BAUDIT  0.108  0.160  0.133  0.183  0.148  0.072  1.000      
TAUDIT -0.005  0.109  0.088 -0.227  0.161  0.187 -0.081  1.000     
BUWRITER  0.219  0.250  0.177 -0.044 -0.251  0.012 -0.044  0.304 1.000    
TUWRITER  0.296  0.404*  0.336 -0.546** -0.216  0.041 -0.142 -0.002 0.287 1.000   
EF  0.409*  0.597***  0.501** -0.462* -0.092 -0.087  0.262  0.180 0.403* 0.683*** 1.000  
HORIZON  0.062  0.167 -0.113  0.008 -0.367 -0.167 -0.194  0.117 0.190 0.348 0.203 1.000 
1 All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6  
*     p<=.10 
**   p<=.05 
*** p<=.01 
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Table 11 - Correlation Matrix of Variables used to Test H3 and H4 (PE Ratio Sample) 
 
Variables1 FEPE BFIN TFIN BGINDEX BSIZE TSIZE BAUIDT TAUDIT BUWRITER TUWRITER EF HORIZON 
FEPE  1.000            
BFIN -0.387  1.000           
TFIN -0.272  0.499**  1.000          
BGINDEX -0.186 -0.299  0.019  1.000         
BSIZE  0.337 -0.533 -0.170 -0.156  1.000        
TSIZE -0.124 -0.390 -0.254 -0.250  0.4852**  1.000       
BAUDIT  0.064  0.023  0.071  0.028  0.277  0.152  1.000*      
TAUDIT  0.166  0.242  0.139 -0.510**  0.155  0.111  0.433  1.000     
BUWRITER  0.055  0.409  0.203 -0.209 -0.351 -0.061 -0.134  0.430*  1.000    
TUWRITER -0.449*  0.414*  0.407 -0.003 -0.185  0.062 -0.161  0.262  0.567** 1.000   
EF  0.006  0.152 -0.149 -0.349 -0.178  0.096 -0.436* -0.066  0.420* 0.221 1.000  
HORIZON  0.162  0.115  0.058 -0.254 -0.274 -0.345 -0.672*** -0.059  0.328 0.067 0.352 1.000 
1 All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6  
*     p<=.10 
**   p<=.05 
*** p<=.01 
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5.2 Empirical Results 
5.2.1 Test of H1:  Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success 
 The first set of hypotheses theorizes that management uses the voluntary 
information to increase the likelihood of the merger being completed.  Using a dependent 
variable equal to 1 if the merger is completed and 0 if the merger is withdrawn, it is 
expected that larger firms in the same industry classified as friendly bids are more likely 
to be completed.  Another factor that may increase the likelihood of a merger being 
completed is when the acquiring firm has significant influence over the target company 
or if there is a sufficiently large price premium paid to the target.  
 The primary variables of interest are the disclosure variable, DISC, and the 
financial variables BFIN and TFIN.  If management succeeds in using the voluntary 
disclosure of earnings estimates to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, 
the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information will be positively related to the 
completion of the merger. 
 Table 12 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of 
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (2).   
Even with the small number of withdrawn mergers in the sample the chi-square 
test revealed a p-value of 0.1423.  The disclosure variable (DISC) is insignificant, thus 
hypothesis H1a is not supported.  The variable BFIN, which measures the financial 
strength of the bidder firm, has a negative coefficient of -0.0961 and has a p-value of 
0.083, thus supporting hypothesis H1b.  This negative coefficient may indicate that 
bidder firms that are not doing as well financially may be seeking other ways to become 
stronger.  One way that a firm may get stronger is to merge with another company and 
combine their resources to gain market share and reduce costs.  Finally, the financial 
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strength variable of the target firm (TFIN) is insignificant; therefore hypothesis H1c is 
not supported. 
  Table 12 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable 
indicating whether the merger was completed. 
 
Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE  
+ β6 INDUSTRY + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε  
 Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic p-value 
Intercept 5.762 5.742 1.00 0.316 
DISC 2.705 2.098 1.29 0.197 
BFIN -0.096 0.055 -1.73 0.083 
TFIN -0.072 0.103 -0.70 0.484 
BSIZE -0.159 0.694 -0.23 0.816 
TSIZE -0.992 0.717 -0.14 0.890 
INDUSTRY 1.366 1.168 1.17 0.242 
FRIENDLY 0.247 2.184 0.11 0.910 
INFLUENCE 0.045 0.089 0.51 0.611 
PREMIUM -0.015 0.023 -0.65 0.518 
N 92 Total 86 Completed 6 Withdrawn  
LR Chi2 (9) 13.47    
Prob > Chi2 0.142    
Pseudo R2 0.060    
where:  
COMPLETE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
FRIENDLY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise 
INFLUENCE Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets 
PREMIUM (Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1 
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   Results of the model testing the first set of hypotheses could be sensitive to the 
specification of a couple of variables; therefore, additional tests are performed to examine 
the sensitivity of the specification of the variables INFLUENCE, BFIN, and TFIN.  
The study defines the variable INFLUENCE as the bidder firm’s total assets / the 
target firm total assets.  Another way to define the variable INFLUENCE is BSIZE / 
TSIZE.  Defining influence as BSIZE / TSIZE created a multicollinearity problem 
between the three size variables (BSIZE, TSIZE, and INFLUENCE) and therefore cannot 
be tested. 
The financial strength variables of BFIN and TFIN could be defined as 
dichotomous variables equaling 1 if the financial strength is above the mean and 0 
otherwise.   
Table 13 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of 
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (2) with new 
variable definitions for BFIN and TFIN.  The variable DISC used to test hypothesis H1a 
remains insignificant, the variable BFIN used to test hypothesis H1b is negative and 
significant, and the variable TFIN used to test hypothesis H1c is insignificant.  The 
negative and significant coefficient for the variable BFIN confirms the suggestion that 
bidder firms that are weaker are more likely to complete a merger.   
5.2.2 Test of H2:  Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings 
Estimates 
To examine the characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, cross-
sectional variations in the probability of disclosing or not disclosing are tested on various 
firm characteristics. 
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Table 13 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable indicating 
whether the merger was completed. 
 
Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE  
+ β6 INDUSTRY + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε  
 Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic p-value 
Intercept 5.763 5.742 1.00 0.316 
DISC 2.705 2.099 1.29 0.197 
BFIN -0.096 0.055 -1.73 0.083 
TFIN -0.724 0.103 -0.70 0.484 
BSIZE -0.159 0.694 -0.23 0.819 
TSIZE -0.099 0.717 -0.14 0.890 
INDUSTRY 1.366 1.168 1.17 0.242 
FRIENDLY 0.023 2.183 0.11 0.910 
INFLUENCE 0.045 0.089 0.51 0.611 
PREMIUM -0.014 0.023 -0.65 0.518 
N 92 Total 86 Completed 6 Withdrawn  
LR Chi2 (9) 13.47    
Prob > Chi2 0.142    
Pseudo R2 0.060    
where:  
COMPLETE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm’s Z-score is above the 
mean Z-scores in the sample as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula, 0 
otherwise 
TFIN 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s Z-score is above the mean 
Z-scores in the sample as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula, 0 
otherwise 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
FRIENDLY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise 
INFLUENCE Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets 
PREMIUM (Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1 
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 This set of hypotheses examines whether a firm’s financial characteristics, 
corporate governance, and the presence of a golden parachute influence whether or not a 
firm voluntarily discloses earnings estimates while controlling for size, whether the firms 
are in the same industry, type of auditor, and quality of underwriter.  Weak financial and 
corporate governance characteristics would indicate that management is using the 
voluntary information to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, while 
stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics would suggest that stronger 
firms are more likely to provide more information to their shareholders. 
 Table 14 reports coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of 
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (3).  The small 
number of observations has created a weak test in which the chi-square test revealed a p-
value of 0.267.  
 The financial strength variables of the bidder and target firms have different signs.  
The variable BFIN has a coefficient of 0.7734 and is significant at the 0.055 level (H2a) 
and the variable TFIN has a negative coefficient of -0.4053 and an insignificant p-value 
of 0.209 (H2b).  With a correlation between BFIN and TFIN of 0.1413, it is unlikely the 
result can be explained by multicollinearity.  While TFIN is insignificant, conclusions on 
its sign may be drawn with this small sample size.  A positive coefficient for BFIN 
indicates that bidder firms that are stronger financially are more willing to disclose 
earnings estimates than those bidder firms that are weaker.  This finding goes along with 
the suggestion that the bidder firms that are stronger financially are more willing to 
provide information.  This suggestion, along with the weak finding that target firms that 
are weaker financially are more likely to provide earnings forecasts, may indicate that 
bidder and target firms use these forecasts to sway shareholder votes of the bidder firm.  
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At this time, this study is not examining the quality of the information but whether or not 
the information was disclosed.  The variables testing BGINDEX, TGINDEX, and 
PCHUTE used to hypotheses H2c, H2d, and H2e were all insignificant. 
 The variable TSIZE was positive and significant at the .05 level as in studies by 
Cox [1985], Imhoff [1978], Ruland [1979], and Waymire [1985].  Unlike Clarkson 
[1992], the variable for underwriter reputation, BUWRITER, is negative and significant 
at the .10 level indicating that an underwriter with a weaker reputation is more likely to 
provide an earnings forecast.  This finding could be from the small sample size or that 
underwriters with weaker reputations may need to disclose more information in a merger 
and acquisition setting to decrease the information asymmetry between the firm and its 
shareholders. 
 As an additional test, the sample size used to test the second set of hypotheses is 
expanded by omitting the corporate governance variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX.  
Omitting the corporate governance variables increases the sample size to 92 mergers and 
provides a more powerful test.  The increase in power comes with the cost of creating the 
problem of omitted variables.  Omitted variable bias occurs if the omitted variables 
BGINDEX or TGINDEX are a determinant of the dependent variable DISC and 
correlated with at least one other independent variable.  The following logistic regression 
is tested: 
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Prob (DISC = 1) =  β0  
Test Variables:  + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 PCHUTE  
Control Variables:  + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT  
    + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF  
    + β11 INDUSTRY     (10) 
Where: 
Variable Description 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
PCHUTE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
  
 Table 15 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of 
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (10).  The chi-
66 
square test revealed a goodness of fit at the .02 level indicating that the model fits the 
data.  As previously reported, the variable indicating the financial strength of the bidder 
firm, BFIN, is positive and significant indicating that firms that are stronger financially 
are more willing to provide earnings estimates in the joint proxy-prospectus.   
Table 14 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable 
indicating whether the firm voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates 
 
Prob (DISC = 1) = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINEX + β4 TGINDEX + β5 PCHUTE 
+ β6 BSIZE + β7 TSIZE + β8 BAUDIT  + β9 BUWRITER + β10 TUWRITER + β11 EF 
+ β12 INDUSTRY  
 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic p-value 
Intercept 10.627 10.30 1.03 0.302 
BFIN 0.773 0.403 1.92 0.055 
TFIN -0.405 0.323 -1.26 0.209 
BGINDEX -0.181 0.313 -0.58 0.562 
TGINDEX -0.471 0.318 -1.48 0.139 
PCHUTE -0.451 1.440 -0.31 0.754 
BSIZE -0.669 0.481 -1.39 0.164 
TSIZE 2.013 0.947 2.12 0.034 
BAUDIT -0.836 2.241 -0.37 0.709 
BUWRITER -2.422 1.323 -1.83 0.067 
TUWRITER -0.340 0.319 -1.07 0.287 
EF 0.112 1.775 0.06 0.950 
INDUSTRY -1.211 1.512 -0.80 0.423 
N 28    
LR Chi2 (12) 14.59    
Prob > Chi2 0.265    
Pseudo R2 0.377    
where:  
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
TGINDEX G-Index of target firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
PCHUTE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
INDUSTRY Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same SIC Code, 0 otherwise 
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Table 15 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable 
indicating whether the firm voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates 
 
Prob (DISC = 1) = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 PCHUTE + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE  
+ β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF 
+ β11 INDUSTRY  
 Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic p-value 
Intercept -6.416 2.710 -2.37 0.018 
BFIN 0.059 0.317 1.85 0.064 
TFIN -0.170 0.531 -0.32 0.749 
PCHUTE 0.530 0.487 1.09 0.277 
BSIZE 0.259 0.160 1.62 0.106 
TSIZE 0.115 0.213 0.54 0.588 
BAUDIT -1.776 1.090 -1.63 0.103 
TAUDIT 0.521 0.963 0.54 0.589 
BUWRITER 0.119 0.100 1.19 0.236 
TUWRITER 0.511 0.139 0.37 0.714 
EF 0.621 1.097 0.57 0.571 
INDUSTRY 0.401 0.597 0.67 0.502 
N 100    
LR Chi2 (12) 21.81    
Prob > Chi2 0.026    
Pseudo R2 0.167    
Where:  
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Table 15 (continued) 
 
DISC Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
PCHUTE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise 
BSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets 
TSIZE Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
 
5.2.3 Test of H3:  Earnings Estimate Bias 
5.2.3.1 Are Earnings Estimates Biased? 
 To conduct the tests of the third set of hypotheses, the sample is limited to 
companies choosing to provide EPS estimates or projected PE Ratios for the merged 
entity.  The forecast errors are examined to determine if these forecasts are biased.  As 
discussed in the development of Hypothesis 3, if management is trying to persuade 
shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, then these optimistic forecasts may be used to 
sway shareholder votes.   
 Table 16 provides the results of the t-test for the EPS and PE Ratio samples.  The 
t-statistic of 2.84 for the EPS sample suggests that firms provide EPS forecasts that are 
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optimistically biased at the 0.01 level.  This optimism indicates that firms may use 
earnings forecasts to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, thus 
supporting hypothesis H3a. 
 The PE Ratio sample is not significantly different from zero with a t-statistic of 
1.200 and is therefore not biased.  Capstaff and Paudyal [1998] found that PE Ratios tend 
to move toward the market PE Ratio.  This t-test rejects hypothesis H3b.  Capstaff and 
Paudyal’s finding suggests that the PE Ratio forecasts would be less biased than EPS 
forecasts. 
Table 16 - Earnings Estimates > 0 
Panel A – Forecasted Earnings per Share 
One sample t-test of H3a:  FEEPS > 0 where: 
(Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted Earnings – Actual Earnings) / |Actual Earnings|) 
Mean Std. Error Std. Dev. t-statistic P-value 
1.107 0.391 2.140 2.84 0.004 
n = 30     
 
Panel B – Forecasted Price-to-Earnings Ratios 
One sample t-test of H3b:  FEPE > 0 where: 
(Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) /(| Actual PE Ratio|) 
Mean Std. Error Std. Dev. t-statistic P-value 
0.384 0.320 1.692 1.20 0.120 
n = 34     
 
 As an additional test of whether firms provide an optimistic forecast, a Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test is performed on the forecast errors of the EPS and PE Ratio samples to 
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determine if the forecast errors are different from 0. 
 The forecast errors for the EPS sample are calculated as: 
Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted Earnings per Share– Actual Earnings per Share) / 
|Actual Earnings per Share|)                (4) 
 
and the forecast errors for the forecasted PE Ratio sample are calculated as:   
 
Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) / |Actual PE Ratio|)   (5) 
 Table 17 presents the results for both samples.  As indicated with the t-test, the 
EPS sample is significant at the .01 level indicating that the earnings forecasts are 
optimistically biased (H3a). 
 The PE Ratio sample that provides insignificant results in the t-test does not 
provide significant results in the signed-rank test (H3b), again reflecting that the 
forecasted PE Ratios are not biased.   
 The next section examines the factors that may decrease earnings forecast bias. 
Table 17 - Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
 
Panel A – Earnings Per Share Sample 
 
 Observations Sum Ranks Expected 
Positive 23 404.5 232.5 
Negative 7 60.5 232.5 
Zero 0 0 0 
All 30 465 465 
    
Z 3.538   
Prob > |z| 0.0004   
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Table 17 (continued) 
Panel B – Price-to-Earnings Ratio  Sample 
 
 Observations Sum Ranks Expected 
Positive 14 234 203 
Negative 14 172 203 
Zero 0 0 0 
All 28 406 406 
    
Z 0.706   
Prob > |z| 0.4802   
 
5.2.3.2 Characteristics of Firms that Provide Less Biased Forecasts 
 An additional test examines the potential factors affecting bias.  Tables 18 and 19 
present coefficients, standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, and adjusted R-square for 
equation (6).  Table 18 presents the results for the EPS sample and table 19 presents the 
results for the PE Ratio sample.   
 In the EPS sample, Table 18 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.3812 for a model 
that consists of only 19 observations.  Both financial strength variables and the bidders’ 
corporate governance variable are significant at the 0.1 level.  The financial strength 
variables are both positive indicating that firms that are stronger financially are more 
likely to have biased forecasts.  This is opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis H3c. 
Hypotheses H3c suggests that firms that are stronger financially should have less 
incentives to bias forecasts.  The inconsistency could come from the difference between 
the mean and median of financial strength variables in the sample.  Additional tests are 
preformed to test for sensitivity in variable specification. 
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 The corporate governance variable for the bidder firm (BGINDEX) is also 
positive.  This finding, as expected, indicates that firms with stronger corporate 
governance characteristics provide less biased forecasts, thus supporting hypothesis H3d.   
 The only significant control variable is the variable TSIZE which positive and 
significant at the .05 level.  Additionally, the variable BSIZE is negative and marginally 
significant at the .11 level.  The variables TSIZE and BSIZE have a correlation of 0.6852 
which may be causing the sign differences between the variables. With no bias in the 
PE Ratio sample, it is no surprise that the model is weak and no variables are significant.  
While Table 19 presents the results for this sample, hypotheses H3e and H3f are 
inconclusive.  
 The differences between the mean and median of the financial strength variables 
necessitate the need to examine the sensitivity to the specification of the variables BFIN 
and TFIN.  These variables are defined as continuous variables which are calculated as 
the Altman Z-score of the bidder and target firms respectively.  To test specification of 
these variables, equation (6) is re-estimated using a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
the financial strength variable is greater than the mean and 0 otherwise.   
 Additionally, to correct for the possible multicollinearity between the variables 
BSIZE and TSIZE, equation (6) is re-estimated after deleting each variable. 
 While the results of the tests are not reported, the two financial variables lose 
significance in every test causing the previous finding of H3c to be inconclusive.  The 
corporate governance variable BGINDEX remains significant at the 0.1 level reaffirming 
the finding that firms with stronger corporate governance characteristics provide less 
biased EPS forecasts (H3d). 
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 The next section examines the characteristics of firms with greater forecast 
accuracy. 
Table 18 - Characteristics of Firms Providing Less Biased EPS Forecasts 
 
FEEPS = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT 
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON  
 Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -6.233 6.782 -0.92 0.389 
BFIN 0.088 0.045 1.96 0.091 
TFIN 0.293 0.126 2.33 0.053 
BGINDEX 0.448 0.193 2.32 0.053 
BSIZE -0.530 0.293 -1.81 0.113 
TSIZE 1.122 0.395 2.84 0.025 
BAUDIT -2.113 1.335 -1.58 0.157 
TAUDIT -0.373 1.860 -0.20 0.847 
BUWRITER -0.243 0.197 -1.23 0.257 
TUWRITER -0.258 0.592 -0.44 0.676 
EF 1.667 1.422 1.17 0.279 
HORIZON -0.211 0.827 -0.25 0.806 
N 19    
F(11,5) 2.01    
Prob > F 0.182    
R-squared 0.759    
Adj.-R2 0.381    
Where:  
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Table 18 (continued) 
 
FE Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|) 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
FE Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|) 
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Table 19 - Characteristics of Firms Providing Less Biased PE Ratio Forecasts 
 
 
FEPE = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT  
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 2.849 2.726 1.05 0.344 
BFIN -0.063 0.497 -1.27 0.261 
TFIN -0.001 0.032 -0.03 0.979 
BGINDEX -0.078 0.086 -0.90 0.409 
BSIZE 0.076 0.084 0.90 0.409 
TSIZE -0.174 0.109 -1.59 0.173 
BAUDIT 0.033 0.673 0.05 0.963 
TAUDIT -0.133 0.684 -0.19 0.854 
BUWRITER 0.104 0.068 1.54 0.185 
TUWRITER -0.144 0.147 -0.98 0.373 
EF -0.058 0.336 -0.17 0.869 
HORIZON -0.019 0.532 -0.36 0.736 
N 17    
F(11,5) 1.05    
Prob > F 0.513    
R-squared 0.698    
Adj.-R2 0.034    
where:  
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Table 19 (continued) 
 
FEPE Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|) 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
FE Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|) 
 
5.2.4 Test of H4:  Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy 
Using only mergers that provided either a projected EPS or a projected PE Ratio 
of the new firm, equation (9) examines the characteristics of those firms that provide 
more accurate forecasts.  Since there is little incentive to provide negatively biased 
forecast, one expects that these results should mirror the results in the previous section. 
Table 20 reports results of equation (9) for the EPS sample, and Table 21 reports 
the results of equation (9) of the PE Ratio sample.  The next section examines the EPS 
sample. 
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5.2.4.1 EPS Sample 
In the EPS sample, Table 20 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.4445 with a total of 
only 19 observations.  Once again, both financial strength variables and the corporate 
governance variable of the bidder firm are significant.  The variable BFIN is positive and 
significant at the 0.1 level while the variable TFIN is positive and significant at the 0.05 
level.  This finding is opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis H4a.  Hypothesis 
H4a hypothesized that firms that are stronger financially would provide more accurate 
forecasts while the results suggest that firms that are stronger financially produce the less 
accurate forecasts.  Alternative tests are performed to test the sensitivity of variable 
specification for the financial strength variables. 
 The variable BGINDEX which measures the strength of the corporate governance 
of the bidder firm is positive and significant at the 0.05 level.  This finding indicates that 
bidder firms with stronger corporate governance are more likely to produce more 
accurate forecasts, thus supporting hypothesis H4b 
As in the EPS forecast bias sample, the variable BSIZE has a positive coefficient 
and is significant, while the variable TSIZE has a negative coefficient and is marginally 
significant at the 0.12 level.  The significance may be explained by their correlation of 
0.6852.   
The differences between the mean and median of the financial strength variables 
create the need to examine alternative measures of BFIN and TFIN.  Using dichotomous 
variables for BFIN and TFIN equaling 1 if the financial strength variable is greater than 
the mean and 0 otherwise, an additional test of equation (9) is performed.  The financial 
strength variables become insignificant indicating that BFIN and TFIN are sensitive to 
variable specification and therefore indicates that hypothesis H4a is inconclusive. The 
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corporate governance variable, BGINDEX, remains significant at the 0.1 level while.  
This finding confirms that firms with stronger corporate governance tend to provide more 
accurate forecasts (H4b). 
Table 20 - Characteristics of Firms Providing More Accurate EPS Forecasts 
 
 
|FEEPS| = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT 
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON   
 Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -8.365 6.271 -1.33 0.224 
BFIN 0.085 0.042 2.04 0.081 
TFIN 0.313 0.116 2.68 0.031 
BGINDEX 0.510 0.178 2.86 0.024 
BSIZE -0.475 0.271 -1.75 0.123 
TSIZE 0.997 0.365 2.73 0.029 
BAUDIT -1.873 1.234 -1.52 0.173 
TAUDIT 0.172 1.719 0.10 0.923 
BUWRITER -0.251 0.182 -1.38 0.211 
TUWRITER -0.111 0.547 -0.02 0.984 
EF 1.301 1.315 0.99 0.355 
HORIZON -0.271 0.764 -0.35 0.733 
N 19    
F(11,5) 2.31    
Prob > F 0.138    
R-squared 0.784    
Adj.-R2 0.445    
where:  
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Table 20 (continued) 
 
|FE| Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)| 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
 
5.2.4.2 PE Ratio Sample  
 In the PE Ratio sample, Table 21 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.6726 with 
only 17 observations.    The variable TFIN is negative and significant at the 0.1 level 
while the variable BFIN is insignificant.  This finding indicates that a target firm that is 
stronger financially provides more accurate PE Ratio forecasts providing results that are 
contrary to the prediction of hypothesis H4c.  Additional tests are performed to test the 
sensitivity of variable specification. 
 The variable BGINDEX, which is a measure of the corporate governance strength 
of the bidder firm, is insignificant and, therefore, does not support hypothesis H4d. 
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 The results also show that the coefficient for TSIZE is negative and significant 
while the variable BSIZE is insignificant at the .23 level and positive.  This result is 
probably due to some multicollinearity in the sample.  Additional multicollinearity issues 
may have also caused the variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT have opposite signs.   
Table 21 - Characteristics of Firms Providing More Accurate PE Ratio Forecasts 
 
 
|FEPE| = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT  
 
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON  
 Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -0.021 0.904 -0.02 0.983 
BFIN 0.020 0.016 1.23 0.274 
TFIN -0.023 0.010 -2.25 0.075 
BGINDEX -0.004 0.029 -0.13 0.900 
BSIZE 0.038 0.028 1.35 0.234 
TSIZE -0.089 0.036 -2.45 0.058 
BAUDIT 0.582 0.223 2.61 0.048 
TAUDIT -0.218 0.227 -0.96 0.380 
BUWRITER 0.033 0.022 1.48 0.198 
TUWRITER 0.018 0.049 0.37 0.724 
EF 0.199 0.111 1.79 0.134 
HORIZON 0.308 0.176 1.74 0.142 
N 17    
F(11,5) 2.01    
Prob > F 0.182    
R-squared 0.759    
Adj.-R2 0.381    
where:  
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Table 21 (continued) 
 
|FE| Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.   
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)| 
BFIN Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
TFIN Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula 
BGINDEX G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003] 
BSIZE Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor 
TSIZE Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
BAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
TAUDIT Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise 
BUWRITER Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
TUWRITER Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters 
EF Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise 
HORIZON # of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365 
 
 To test for the sensitivity to specification of the financial strength variables, 
equation (9) is re-estimated using dichotomous variables for BFIN and TFIN that are 
equal to 1 if the financial strength variable is above the mean and 0 otherwise.  As in the 
EPS sample, the variable TFIN becomes insignificant indicating that the financial 
strength variable is sensitive to specification.  This finding provides inconclusive results 
for hypotheses H4c. 
Additionally, with this estimation, the variable BGINDEX is negative and 
significant at the 0.1 level.  As with the results of the PE Ratio sample examining factors 
that decrease forecast bias, the results of the PE Ratio sample used to examine 
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characteristics of firms with greater forecast accuracy are inconclusive (H4d).   
 Table 22 provides a summary of findings and chapter 6 summarizes and draws 
conclusions from the results of the analysis. 
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Table 22 - Summary of Findings 
 
H1a:  Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the 
likelihood that a merger will be completed. 
Not Supported 
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the 
bidder firm and the likelihood of the merger being completed. 
Negative  
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the 
target firm and the likelihood of the merger being completed. 
Not Supported 
H2a:  There is an association between the financial strength of the 
bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  
Positive  
H2b:  There is an association between the financial strength of the 
target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  
Not Supported 
H2c:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate 
governance of the bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to 
jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  
Not Supported 
H2d:  There is an association between the strength of the corporate 
governance of the target firm and the decision of the merging firms to 
jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.  
Not Supported 
H2e:  There is an association between target firms that have CEO 
golden parachutes and the decision of the merging firms to jointly 
choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. 
Not Supported 
H3a:  For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm 
is positively biased. 
Supported 
H3b:  For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new 
firm is positively biased. 
Not Supported 
H3c:  Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
Inconclusive 
H3d:  Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
Supported 
H3e:  Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated 
with merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
Not Supported 
H3f:  Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated 
with merging firms that have stronger corporate governance 
characteristics. 
Not Supported 
H4a:  EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics. 
Inconclusive 
H4b:  EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics. 
Supported 
H4c:  PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics.. 
Inconclusive 
H4d:  PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with 
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance. 
Inconclusive 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Most voluntary disclosure studies have one thing in common; the studies examine 
management decisions to provide voluntary information to the shareholders of their firm.  
In the case of a merger or acquisition, management is now providing information on what 
could be considered a new firm:  a new firm that consists of both the bidder and the target 
firms. Mergers and acquisitions provide a unique setting in which management may 
decide to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates for reasons other than just providing an 
earnings benchmark. 
   The objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of those firms that 
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus when completing a 
merger or acquisition.  With management already agreeing on its post-merger 
compensation, there is an incentive for management to provide shareholders with enough 
information to ensure that the merger is completed.  These voluntarily disclosed earnings 
estimates provide one way for management to provide additional information to their 
shareholders. 
6.1 Summary and Implications 
 The first test of this study examines the effects that the managements’ voluntary 
disclosure decisions and the bidder and target firms’ financial characteristics have on 
whether or not the merger is completed.  Results suggest that shareholders of bidder firms 
that are weaker financially are more likely to approve a merger.  One reason that these 
shareholders of weaker firms may vote in favor of the merger is to try to get stronger by 
merging with another firm.  By merging, firms are able to combine their resources to gain 
market share and reduce costs by creating synergy between the two firms.   
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Examining the characteristics of the firms that jointly choose to voluntarily 
disclose earnings estimates provides insight as to which types of firms are more likely to 
provide earnings estimates during a merger or acquisition.  Results suggest that bidder 
firms with stronger financial characteristics are more apt to voluntarily disclose earnings 
estimates.  While this finding may suggest that firms that are stronger financially provide 
more information to their shareholders to reduce information asymmetry, an alternative 
explanation could be that bidder firms that are stronger financially may need to provide 
more information to convince their shareholders that the target firm will provide value to 
the bidder firm. 
Next, this study examines the forecast error of the earnings forecasts to determine 
if the earnings forecasts are biased.  Results indicate that for those firms that provided 
EPS forecasts, the forecasts were optimistically biased.  The finding that firms with 
stronger financial characteristics are more likely to provide earnings forecasts combined 
with the result that the EPS forecasts are optimistically biased suggest that these 
voluntary EPS forecasts may be used to enhance the future outlook of the combined firm.  
Enhancing the future outlook of the combined firm could persuade shareholders of both 
the bidder and target firms to vote in favor of the merger.  
 Lastly, the characteristics of the firms that provided voluntary earnings estimates 
were examined to find that firms with stronger corporate governance provided more 
accurate and less biased EPS forecasts.  This finding indicates that corporate governance 
is doing what it was intended to do - protect shareholders’ rights.  If firms with stronger 
corporate governance provide more accurate and less biased forecasts, then management 
must be governed in a way to enhance the accuracy of the information provided to their 
shareholders. 
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6.2  Limitations 
 There are several limitations associated with this study.  Being that this study 
examines the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) of a merger or acquisition, the sample is 
a small percentage of the number of announced mergers.  Firms must provide a joint 
proxy-prospectus whenever stock is included in the transaction to complete the merger.  
Therefore, a joint proxy-prospectus is only filed for approximately 5% of the total 
mergers announced. 
 Additionally, to provide for a more manageable dataset, only the mergers with 
transaction values of $1,000,000 or more were examined.  This creates a large firm bias 
that may affect the results. 
 Lastly, the years 2002 and 2003 were used in the sample to provide the two most 
recent years that earnings data could be gathered for three years after the merger 
announcement.  While there is no reason to believe that these two years would provide 
results that would be significantly different from other years, there is a possibility that a 
difference may exist. 
6.3 Future Research 
 This study has created a unique data set which will be expanded throughout my 
career.  Mergers and acquisitions provide a unique and interesting setting in which 
management and shareholder incentives may not be aligned. 
As the data set is expanded, there are many questions that could be answered 
involving the voluntary disclosure provided during a merger or acquisition.  These 
questions may consist of how analysts or institutions use the voluntary information or 
how these forecasts may affect the future performance of the new firm. 
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The following are examples of questions that may be asked of analysts’ use of the 
voluntary information.  Are analysts able to use the forecasts to determine the future 
performance of the combined firm?  Do analyst base buy and sell recommendations on 
the forecasts? 
Questions involving the use of the voluntary information from institutional 
ownership include:  how does institutional ownership react to the forecasts?  Do the 
institutions sell the stock once the firms issue a joint earnings forecast?  Are the 
institutions able to determine which forecasts are optimistically biased? Each of these 
questions examines how accounting users outside of the firm view the voluntary 
information provided by management. 
The merger and acquisition setting is different from the normal financial 
accounting and reporting setting in that managers have incentives other than just 
providing an earnings benchmark to their shareholders.  Mangers are providing 
information on a new firm that has not yet been created.  This dataset provides a 
foundation in which these differences in management incentives can be investigated.  
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